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Abstract
In this thesis the status and feasibility of the two-state solution, the primary and most
widely-accepted potential resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be analyzed. It
considers aspects such as physical challenges (geography and topography of the land),
regressive and damaging actions to the peace process by Israelis and Palestinians, and the
newly developing changes in regional alliances and interests in the Middle East. The status of
the traditional two-state solution, due to its history, obstacles, and current regional
developments, has implications for future negotiations and have changed the direction of
peace talks. Dramatic shifts in regional interests and the balance of power in the Middle East
have caused the Saudi-led Gulf states to increase their strategic cooperation with Israel,
permanently changing the direction of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. This is clear especially
when considering the significant changes in the regional dynamics of the Middle East, amid a
growing relationship between Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other Sunni Gulf states. Other
factors – the future of the Iran nuclear deal and the future of Israeli and Palestinian leadership –
will affect peace talks and will likely influence the components of a peace deal potentially
proposed by the Trump Administration. Among these factors, the Arab states’ relatively new
and substantial signs of gravitation towards Israel to create an anti-Iranian alliance is the
biggest indicators of serious change in Arab policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Source Material
The literature and source material which was used for this thesis report consists of
books, scholarly journals, and other articles related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This
paper focuses primarily on the peace process following the 1993 Oslo Accords. Information was
also gathered from Israeli, Palestinian, American, and other government documents, the United
Nations, and Israeli, Palestinian, and other international NGO reports and documents, including
various human rights groups which monitor and collect data on the conflict. Most of the
statistics and survey data collected is from Israeli and Palestinian non-profits and think tanks,
and Israeli and Palestinian census reports for analyzing demographic information and public
opinion polls. Much of the more recent information regarding the peace process and its up-todate developments is sourced from Israeli, Arabic, and Western media sources. Lastly,
information regarding the past, and future of the peace process was collected through
previously recorded interviews and speeches given by American, Israeli, Palestinian, and Saudi
officials. After analyzing this data, a determination was made about the status of the two-state
solution, and the future of the conflict and peace process given modern circumstances. A
variety of sources, including media reports, data collections, and interviews with government
officials were used to assess the potential outcomes of the conflict and peace process.
Introduction
The two-state solution was an idea to partition the Israelis and Palestinians, creating
two states for two-peoples, in a very small land. Many have worked tirelessly over the last fifty
years and many worked tirelessly to ensure is infeasibility. Israeli settlements have been
constructed with the purpose of strategically dividing the West Bank and hindering the chance
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of any future Palestinian state. Israel’s increased terror threat on all sides, compounded by the
direct result of its disengagement from Gaza in 2005, have disproven the ideal “land for peace”
narrative. Today the question remains: Is the two-state solution still a feasible option? Have the
obstacles of the last fifty years changed the status of the two-state solution and effected its
feasibility? A two-state solution with borders defined by the 1949 Armistice lines has become
impractical with increased settlement activity and threats to Israel’s security.
However, most significant to the future of the peace process, due to recent shifting
relationships and dynamics between regional powers in the Middle East, Israel is no longer
forced to accept the traditional two-state solution. Because of the changing relationships and
realities in the Middle East, Israel is getting more bargaining power from the support it is
receiving from powerful Arab states and the Trump Administration. Palestinians are losing
bargaining power as Arab countries are finding it to be in their interest to align with Israel. Due
to the resulting change in direction of the negotiation process, the best solution which is still
attainable is a lesser version of a two-state solution; a solution that doesn’t call for one
sovereign state or two, but one state and one with limited sovereignty. A watered-down twostate solution which does not meet all the Palestinians’ demands. It is an unconventional
thought in considering a fair and just peace deal, but it is the most practical and in the best
interest of Israel, the current American administration, and the neighboring Arab countries. The
information present and the status of the two-state solution and the changing regional
dynamics of the Middle East will be used to determine the components of a potential peace
deal proposed by the Trump administration.
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Historical Context to the Two-State Solution
The most widely accepted solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among the
international community is a two-state solution based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338. Resolution 242 was unanimously passed by the Security Council following the Six-Day
War of 1967, during which Israel conquered the formerly Jordanian-occupied West Bank and
Egyptian-occupied Gaza strip (in addition to the Syrian Golan Heights and Egyptian Sinai
Peninsula.) The resolution called for an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied in
the conflict.1 This concept was reaffirmed by the adoption of Resolution 338, which called for a
cease fire to the 1973 Yom Kippur, launched by Egypt and Syria to regain the territory they had
lost in the previous war. The resolution also called for the full implementation of Resolution
242.2 The foundation for a practical two-state solution and the establishment of a future
Palestinian state was laid out in 1993 with the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements. Also known as the Oslo Accords, they were signed by then
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, with U.S. President Bill Clinton as mediator. The Oslo Accords laid the foundation
for a two-state solution based on the 1949 armistice lines, or the Green Line, inferring that a
future Palestinian state be established in the West Bank and Gaza, the territories which Israel
occupied in the 1967 war. However, in the 25 years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the
long sought after two-state solution has become more impractical due to changing realities on
the ground, severely hindering the feasibility of a two-state solution. The reality of what a long-

1

“S/RES/242 (1967) of 22 November 1967” United Nations

2

“S/RES/338 (1973) of 22 October 1973” United Nations
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term peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would look like is changing
dramatically.
Deeply Rooted and Ideological claims to the land
Many Israelis and Palestinians believe that a two-state solution is unattainable due to
the opposite side’s perceived refusal to live alongside the other in any circumstance. For the
Palestinians, historic Palestine, the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea,
is the land of their ancestors, unquestionably. There had been continuous Muslim and Arab
presence in the land for centuries prior to with the establishment of Israel or the “Nakba”
(catastrophe in Arabic) in 1948. For many Palestinians and their supporters, agreeing to two
states in the land is already compromising enough, given the great injustice that has been done
unto them. What is seen as the most acceptable by the world (the two-state solution) would
mean a state in only 22% of their historic homeland and excluding the thousands of their
ancestral towns and villages in Israel, many of which no longer exist. During the great expulsion
and exodus of Palestinians from Palestine and the newly created Israel in 1948, an estimated
700,000 Palestinian residents were forced to flee or were expelled. The remaining of those
refugees and their descendants today, now totaling around five million, believe the land in the
state of Israel is rightly theirs, and they should be allowed to return to it. This is known as the
right of return, a crucial Palestinian demand to any peace deal.
Because of the nature of the establishment of Israel and the Nakba, many Palestinians
are unwilling to settle for a two-state solution, as their ancestral land is in Israel. Many
Palestinians have never and will never be willing to accept any Jewish state living beside them.
A common practice in Palestinian propaganda is to flatly reject and deny any Jewish connection
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to the land of Israel, denying them any legitimacy or rights to live in the land of the Jewish
patriarchs. Palestinian opposition to the establishment of any Jewish homeland or state Jewish
state in the land goes back to the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini.
Fearful of an establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, Al-Husseini encouraged his Muslim
followers to fight alongside Nazi units, and to contribute to the Nazis’ annihilation of world
Jewry.3 Proposed settlements for two-states in historic Palestine were proposed by the Peel
Commission in 1937, the UN Partition plan of 1947, and offers to the PLO made by Israeli Prime
Ministers. All offers to accept two-states have been rejected by the Palestinian Arab
population.
In all, Israelis view the idea of two-states as an idea of the past, which has been
repeatedly rejected by the Arabs, as a sign of rejection to any Jewish state in the land. Israelis
view a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza to establish a Palestinian state would sooner
or later bring about Israel’s demise. There are too many Palestinians who would not stop short
of reclaiming all historic Palestine back, and will continue to wage war against Israel
indefinitely. In addition, the conquering of the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, the Biblical
heartland of Judaism, as well as historic Palestine for Palestinians, in the 1967 war has changed
Israeli views on ceding territory. Many Israelis view the acquisition of this land as a divine act
and a sign that the Jews were truly meant to return to this land, as it is stated in the Bible.
Because of the religious aspect of acquiring this land, many Israelis will continue to refuse to
give up any territory to another sovereign. It is even written in the Likud party charter that

3

“Statement on Hajj Amin Al-Husayni.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum

Bucksbaum 9

Israel shall not recognize any Palestinian state or relinquish power to any foreign entity in the
biblical land of Israel. Specifically, “between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli
sovereignty.”4 The refusal to make any land concessions to the other side is shared by both
Israelis and Palestinians, however in the most extreme circles.
Legacy of the Oslo Accords
Prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israel and the PLO needed public
attention in diplomacy. They both needed to showcase their desire to move forward with peace
talks to the international community. Israel was facing scrutiny for its handling of the first
intifada, a major uprising of Palestinians that began in 1987 that went on until the agreement
was reached in 1993. In all, more than 1,000 Palestinians were killed in clashes with Israeli
security forces, and Israel came under fire for then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s “broken
bones” policy, instructing security forces to break demonstrators’ arms and legs to squash the
rebellion.5
The first Intifada was beneficial to the Palestinians in many ways, primarily paving the
way for the Oslo Accords and relative autonomy. It gave the Palestinians a greater sense of
national unity, empowerment, and self-confidence, and gave them more favorable
international media coverage, after an era of largely one-sided media reports of PLOorchestrated plane hijackings and other terrorist attacks. It also changed the narrative of
Palestinian resistance from violence and terrorism to non-lethal, popular resistance in the
occupied territories. It increased awareness and polarized Israeli society on the Palestinian

4

“A concise history of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L.
Klausner, Prentice Hall, 1991, p. 258.
5 Hass, Amira. “Broken Bones and Broken Hopes.” Haaretz.com, 13 Jan. 2018.
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question and empowered the peace camp of the Israeli left. It also forced Israel to dispatch
large numbers of forces and turned the occupied territories into serious economic liabilities for
Israel. As violence continued, it gave the Palestinians leverage in the coming negotiations.
Jordan’s King Hussein felt pressured to relinquish all Jordanian ties and claims to the West
Bank, allowing for the PLO to become the dominant party in future negotiations. Through the
first Intifada, the Palestinian message to Israelis of desire for separation and self-determination
was delivered clearly.6
Amid the first Intifada, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in the first Gulf
War. Yasser Arafat isolated himself and the PLO from the Arab states by openly supporting
Saddam’s mission, empowering the PLO’s main rival Hamas. Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance
Movement, grew out of the first Intifada and received financial support from Iran. It gained
popular support during the first Intifada by branding the PLO as too secular, and ineffective in
reclaiming historic Palestine from Israel. At a time when it was bankrupt, politically isolated
from the Arab states, and challenged by rival Palestinian militant groups, the PLO needed
decisive action to maintain its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Palestinian people as
well as the international community and the Arab states.7
Israel and the PLO began conducting secret negotiations in 1992 in Oslo, Norway. A year
later in Washington D.C., Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed
the Oslo Accords, formally titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government

6Efaw,
7

Jamie. “Palestinian Psychological Operations: The First Intifada.” American Diplomacy, Jan. 2006

“Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with
Documents, by Charles D. Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 429
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Arrangements. This was meant to be an interim agreement, to establish a framework for a
permanent settlement, to be later established by the two parties based on Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338.8 By signing the agreement Israel accepted the Palestinian Liberation
Organization as the legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people. In exchange, the
PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist. As part of the plan for limited
Palestinian autonomy, the Palestinian Authority was created to assume governing control over
parts of the West Bank and Gaza over a five-year period, upon Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza
and the West Bank city of Jericho. The most contentious, such as permanent borders,
settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees, were set aside for future negotiations.
The arrangements and the road to an eventual two-state solution hit a series of
obstacles in the years following the Oslo Accords. In February of 1994, after the signing of the
Oslo Accords, Israeli right-wing extremist and Jewish Defense League (JDL) member Baruch
Goldstein entered the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and massacred Palestinian worshippers. He
murdered 29 and injured 125 Palestinians before he was disarmed and killed by survivors of the
massacre. In retaliation, a series of terrorist attacks against Israelis in the occupied territories
and in Israel followed, beginning the era of suicide bombings in Israel. Despite the outbreak of
reciprocal violence and Goldstein’s blatant attempt to “end the Oslo Accords,” as he told he
told friends he intended to do, the peace negotiations continued. 9 The two parties signed the
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or “Oslo II” in September 1995. Oslo II

8

Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration of Principles.” Mfa.gov.il.
“Dreams Deferred: A Concise Guide to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Movement to Boycott Israel.” Dreams Deferred:
A Concise Guide to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Movement to Boycott Israel, by Cary Nelson, Indiana University Press,
2016, p. 94.
9
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divide the West Bank into three administrative regions, or areas, and security and
administrative responsibilities were to be transferred over from Israel to the Palestinian
Authority in certain degrees in each region, or area.10 Area A, in total 19% of the West Bank,
was to be placed under total security and administrative control of the Palestinian Authority.
Area B, 21% of the West Bank, was to be under mixed control of Israel and the PA, with the PA
controlling administration and governance with Israel managing security. Of the 2.6 million
Palestinians living in the West Bank, most of them live in the urban population centers in Areas
A and B. However, these areas are a series of 165 noncontiguous islands, separated and
surrounded by the much larger Area C, comprising the remaining 60% of the West Bank. Israel
controls all administrative and security responsibilities in Area C.11
Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in November of 1995 by Yigal Amir, Jewish extremist
who opposed surrendering any land to the Palestinians on grounds of religious and ideological
views. Rabin’s signing the Oslo Accords, his subsequent assassination, the Hebron Massacre and
the following riots and terror attacks, all influenced Israel’s May 1996 elections, in which the
right-wing Likud party was elected, led by Benjamin Netanyahu. As outlined in the Likud Party
Charter, the party opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state or the relinquishing of any
territory to foreign forces between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea. It also sees
settlement expansion as vital to the Zionist vision.12 However, even under this leadership, Prime
Minister Netanyahu signed further agreements to make more territorial concessions, including

10

Ariel Center for Policy Research, The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) September 28, 1995

11

Nelson, 102
Bickerton and Klausner, 258

12
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the Hebron Protocol and the Wye River Memorandum. These concessions led to party
infighting in Likud which eventually brought the government down in January 1999.13
For Israelis and Palestinians, expectations brought by the Oslo Accords were unfulfilled
and misaligned, resulting in a stalling out of the peace process. Palestinians believe Israel
undermined the Oslo Accords with continued settlement-construction in the occupied
territories. The continued expansion of settlements was not specifically prohibited by the
interim agreements of 1993 and 1995, but the Palestinians assumed this to be self-evident as
part of further cooperation. The Israelis, in turn, expected the Oslo Accords to give them a
partner with which to conduct security cooperation and fight terrorism within its territory.
However, to avoid being collaborators or enforcers of Israel, the PA had to tread lightly and
maintain its credibility among the Palestinian people. The PA violated the terms of Oslo nearly
immediately due to the excessive shipment of arms to what was meant to be a strong police
force. Israel feared that the numbers of Palestinians in arms and types of armaments being
brought into PA territory significantly exceeded the limits established by the agreements and
were fit for an offensive army than a police force. In some cases, Palestinian police officers
turned their arms on their Israeli counterparts. Israel was also angered by the PA’s lack of
cooperation in preventing terrorist attacks, disarming terrorist militias, and arresting high
profile terrorists. 14
The Labor Party, led by Ehud Barak, defeated Likud in May of 1999, leading to some
regained hope in the peace process. Barak vowed to reengage in peace talks with both Syria

13
14

United States, Department of State, “The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.”
Nelson, 248
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and the Palestinians and to withdraw Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. In July of 2000,
President Clinton invited Barak and Arafat to Camp David to reach a final-status agreement on
the future of the West Bank and Gaza. The most contentious issues remained the largest
obstacle for agreement: Borders, Jerusalem, and a right of return for refugees. Clinton, Barak,
and Arafat failed to reach an agreement, and released a trilateral statement reflecting on
shared values and ambitions of the negotiations and future of the peace process. 15
At the Camp David Summit, Ehud Barak offered Arafat a deal which included a
Palestinian state on 100% of Gaza and more than 95% of the West Bank and the adjoining land.
While accounts differ as to why the Camp David Summit failed, most of the blame, including by
President Clinton, fell onto Arafat for refusing this offer, as it didn’t include the right of return.16
The offer made by Ehud Barak was undeniably unprecedented in its concessions to Palestinian
demands. Israel would only annex a small amount of land in the West Bank to include the
largest settlement blocs, and all others would be dismantled. East Jerusalem would be the
Palestinian capital, and the Old City would be divided. The Palestinians would have total
sovereignty over the Christian and Muslim quarters and custodianship (not sovereignty) of the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. There would be a right of return for refugees to the newly
established Palestine but not to Israel. Arafat refused this offer, and according to Barak, he
never made any counterproposals of his own. Chief American Middle East Negotiator Dennis
Ross recorded that President Clinton lashed out at Arafat, yelling that he had “been here

15

Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David-25-Jul-2000.”
“The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can Be Resolved.” The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can Be
Resolved, by Alan M. Dershowitz, John Wiley, 2006, p. 18.
16
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fourteen days and said no to everything.”17 At one point, near the end of the summit after
Arafat’s final rejection, Clinton reportedly banged on the table in anger, and said: “You are
leading your people and the region to a catastrophe.”18
In response to Barak’s willingness to cede the highly contested Temple Mount to the
Palestinians, then opposition leader Ariel Sharon provocatively visited the complex in the Old
City of Jerusalem, symbolically asserting Israel’s control over it. It is commonly believed that
this provocative act sparked the second Intifada, or the ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada.’ However, testimony
from many PA officials and Yasser Arafat’s wife shows that the second intifada had indeed been
meticulously planned by Arafat as an alternative to engaging in peace talks.19 All momentum in
the peace process was brought to a halt with Bill Clinton’s leaving office and the second
Intifada, characterized by near-daily shootings, stabbings, and suicide bombings, rather than
rock throwing, tire burning, and otherwise nonviolent resistance that characterized much of the
first Intifada.
The peace process in the decade following the Camp David Summit was defined by the
second Intifada and growing international involvement in the peace process. The Arab Peace
Initiative, the Roadmap for Peace established by the “Quartet” (U.S., U.N., E.U., and Russia,)
and the Geneva Accords were all attempts for international players besides the U.S. attempt to
restart meaningful peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and recover from the major
setback that had been from the second Intifada. All these initiatives continued to establish

17
18

Ross, Missing Peace: the inside Story of the Fight for Peace in the Middle East, 705

Morris, Benny. “Arafat Didn’t Negotiate- He Just Kept Saying No.” The Guardian, The Guardian, 22 May 2002,
19 Marcus, Itamar, and Nan J Zilberdik. “Arafat Planned and Led the Intifada: Testimony from PA Leaders and Others.”
Palestinian Media Watch
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precedents and introduce new, creative ideas into the peace process, but all failed to manage
the most tenacious issues and bring the two sides to an agreement. The Arab League, led by
Saudi Arabia, introduced the Arab Peace Initiative (API.) The API called for Israel to withdraw
from all territories it occupied in the 1967 war, in addition to Southern Lebanon, establish a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital, and achieve a
just solution to the refugee problem.20 This proposal was never truly welcomed by Israel.
The last round of negotiations to come as close to obtaining a two-state solution as the
Camp David Summit was the series of meetings and negotiations between Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and Arafat’s successor Mahmoud Abbas in 2008. These talks were
different from previous rounds of discussion because they included more creative thinking in
negotiating the most contentious issues like Jerusalem. Olmert had learned from his time as
mayor of Jerusalem (1993-2003) that maintaining control over the Arab neighborhoods was a
futile policy. This influenced his decision as Prime Minister to offer Abbas the Arab
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem as the capital for a Palestinian state. He also believed that the
Old City and areas consisting of Christian and Muslim holy sites should be managed by a
committee of advisors from five countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the U.S., Israel, and Palestine)an unprecedented and imaginative idea. Olmert’s offer to Mahmoud Abbas consisted of the
following points:


The establishment of a Palestinian state in 100% of Gaza and 93% of the West Bank with
East Jerusalem as its capital.

20

“Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text.” The Guardian, The Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2002,
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Israel annexing 6.3% of the West Bank, (to include the settlement blocs Gush Etzion,
Ma’ale Adumim, Giv’at Ze’ev and Ariel), as well as all the settlements in East Jerusalem
(with Har Homa), in exchange for the equivalent of 5.8% of Israeli territory, in areas
directly surrounding Gaza and the West Bank and parts of the Judean desert.



A territorial link by way of tunnel connecting Gaza and the West Bank would be under
Israeli sovereignty with Palestinian control and is not included in the above percentages.



East Jerusalem would be divided territorially along the lines of the Clinton Parameters,
based on ethnicity except for the “Holy Basin.”



The “Holy Basin,” and all Christian and Muslim holy sites in the areas surrounding
Jerusalem to be managed by a committee of five countries.



Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley.



Israeli acknowledgment of the suffering of- but not responsibility for- Palestinian
refugees, and the absorption of 1,000 refugees per year for a period of 5 years on
“humanitarian” and “family reunification” grounds.2122

Many hailed this proposal by Olmert as unprecedented in its generosity on issues like
Jerusalem, refugees, and the size of the Palestinian state in the West Bank. However, Abbas and
his team believed the territorial exchanges to be unfair and thought the proposals on Jerusalem
and refugees to be “unacceptable.” 23 As in previous negotiations, Israel’s annexation of the
Ariel and Maaleh Adumim settlements was a major source of tension, due to the settlements’
depth inside the West Bank, complicating the contiguity of a Palestinian state. Abbas countered

21

“The Palestine Papers: Olmert’s Offer to the Palestinians.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 23 Jan. 2011
Bernard. “A Plan for Peace That Still Could Be.” The New York Times, The New York Ties, 7 Feb. 2011,
23 Isacharoff, Avi. “Revealed: Olmert’s 2008 Peace Offer to Palestinians.” Jpost.com, The Jerusalem Post, 24 May 2013.
22Avishai,
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Olmert’s land swap proposal with his own map, in which he allowed Israel to annex only 1.9%
of the West Bank. Following the negotiations, a spokesman for Abbas said: "The Palestinian side
will only accept a Palestinian state with territorial continuity, with holy Jerusalem as its capital,
without settlements, and on the June 4, 1967 boundaries."24
After failing to reach an agreement, Abbas claimed that he did not agree to Olmert’s
proposal because he did not allow him to keep the map with the proposed borders, and
apparently pressured him to sign it on the spot. Abbas, feeling pressured and overwhelmed,
Abbas copied the map down on a piece of paper and brought it to Amman to discuss with the
Jordanians and Egyptians. He never responded to Olmert. It is widely believed that Abbas
rejected this deal because he believed he could get a better deal with future Israeli and
American leaders. George Bush was nearing the end of his second term as American president,
and Olmert himself was near the end of his political career due to allegations of corruption, for
which he later served prison time. The peace talks were also derailed by the outbreak of
conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, leading to Operation Cast Lead. Also, like the case of
the Camp David Summit, the subsequent election of 2009 brought a Netanyahu-led Likud
government. The meetings of Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas were the last time Israeli and
Palestinian leaders came close to agreeing on a peace agreement. Negotiations facilitated by
President Obama and his secretary of state John Kerry, ended due to the PA’s attempt to
reunify with Hamas, appearing to be “choosing Hamas over choosing peace” and the outbreak
of Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014.

24

Benn, Aluf, and Reuters. “PA Rejects Olmert’s Offer to Withdraw from 93% of West Bank.” Haaretz.com, 12 Jan. 2018
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Israeli Narrative: Why the Two-State Solution is Unfeasible
Most Israelis believe that the two-state solution is either unattainable or not ideal today
due to the increased threat of terror in an age of advanced weaponry and increased military
capabilities. Israelis believe that the territorial concessions required for a lasting peace
agreement by means of a two-state solution no longer guarantee their safety. Israel’s
contemporary wars fought with Hamas and Hezbollah in the 21 st century have proven that due
to Israel’s small size and its geographic and topographic features, relinquishing the West Bank
and Gaza for a Palestinian state would leave Israel strategically vulnerable to attack.
The threat of terrorism is compounded by the geography and topography of Israel and
the West Bank. Israel proper is a state the size of New Jersey and is 8.7 miles wide at its
narrowest point (from the coastal city of Netanya to the Palestinian city Tul Karem on the edge
of the West Bank). 25 Cities like Tel Aviv, Hadera, and Netanya in Israel’s coastal region
represent the lifeblood of the country. This region is home to 70% of Israel’s civilian population
and 80% of its industrial capacity, and crucial infrastructure targets like Ben Gurion Airport, the
Trans-Israel Highway, and high voltage electric powerlines.26. In addition, other strategic assets
are located in this small strip of land such as the Ashdod Port, Israel’s banking headquarters,
arrays of computerized databases, vital military bases, and the main headquarters of the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF), the Mossad, and the General Security Service (Shin Bet).27 The distance
from the Palestinian city Tul Karem, which lies east of the Green line and would be a major
population center of a Palestinian state, is only 8.7 miles to the east of the Israeli coastal city of
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Netanya. These strategic threats to Israel’s security posed by the creation of a Palestinian state
based on the Green line are compounded by the topographical difference between Israel and
the West Bank, the territory of the proposed Palestinian state. This coastal plain is overlooked
by the West Bank mountain range, which spans thousands of feet above sea level. Ba’al Hatzor,
the highest point of the West Bank mountain range, stands at 3,609 feet above sea level. The
entire coastal region, including Ben-Gurion airport and most of Israel’s industrial and
communication hubs, would become under constant threat from above. Israel also considers
control of the Jordan Valley to be crucial to maintaining its security, and it desires to maintain a
military presence in the valley in the event of a partial-to-full withdrawal of the West Bank,
even if temporarily.
The Oslo Accords were meant to mark the beginning of a gradual process of Israeli
territorial withdrawal in exchange for Palestinian concessions and commitments to fight
terrorism and establish a functioning state. The Israeli narrative cites the flaws of the concept
of “land for peace”, the concept on which the Oslo Accords of 1993 were based, and the
negative results of Israel’s previous military withdrawals from territory in exchange for peace;
specifically, southern Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005.
Since Israel’s full withdrawal in southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah, heavily armed and
funded by Iran, has been able to firmly establish itself in the territory and amass over 100,000
rockets in the territory. In 2006 Hezbollah and Israel engaged in a disastrous war which saw
rockets falling on homes and communities in northern Israel, causing the death of 55 Israelis.28
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Since 2006 Hezbollah has repeatedly violated the terms of UN Security Council Resolution
1701.29 Today, the group has amassed a stockpile thousands of long and medium range
munitions with sophisticated guidance systems, which could hit every city, town, or military
installation in Israel. In a future conflict, Hezbollah could launch well over 1,500 rockets per day
at Israel, compared to 120 per day in the 2006 war.30 Thus, the scope and severity of the next
Israeli-Lebanese war has increased since the last conflict and military presence in the West
Bank has repeatedly served as crucial to holding Israel’s strategic advantage against its
enemies.
In addition, Israel withdrew all its military forces and 8,000 civilian settlers from the
Gaza Strip in 2005, as part of then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement plan.31 Since
the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the territory has been used by the group Hamas, which came
to govern the Gaza strip through elections and then a violent takeover. Hamas has used Gaza as
a terror base from which to launch thousands of rocket attacks on communities in Southern
Israel and dig underground tunnels into Israeli territory, for purpose of terror and kidnapping
Israeli civilians and soldiers. Three wars between Hamas and Israel have ensued since Israel’s
2005 withdrawal: Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, and
Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
To summarize, many Israelis don’t support the idea of a two-state solution due to their
becoming less safe and receiving more violence and terror upon relinquishing land to their Arab
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neighbors in exchange for peace. For these reasons, Israelis are weary of the idea of a
Palestinian state established in the West Bank and Gaza strip. History has proven that
relinquishing land in exchange for peace has only been met with more war. It is reasonable to
see the creation of a Palestinian state along the Green line, effectively carving Israel up to an
indefensible strip, as suicide.
Palestinian Narrative: Why the Two-State Solution has become Unattainable
Many Palestinians and supporters of Palestinian ambitions for sovereignty and
independence from Israeli occupation also believe the two-state solution to be unattainable,
but for very different reasons than Israelis or their supporters. Many Palestinians believe that
the two-state solution is no longer a viable option due to Israel’s policies throughout its 50
years of occupying the West Bank and Gaza strip. In the eyes of the Palestinians, the largest
obstacle to obtaining a two-state solution over the years is the continued expansion of civilian
settlements, which they, and most of the international community, deem illegal. From Israel’s
capture of the West Bank from Jordan in 1967 until 2016, hundreds of civilian settlements have
been established in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the total number of settlers is now
approaching 600,000. The Israeli government provides economic incentives for Israeli citizens
and immigrants to move to the settlements and has historically used settlement expansion to
justify increased military presence, checkpoints, and roadblocks throughout the West Bank.
Land immediately surrounding settlements is often off-limits for Palestinians, even if it includes
Palestinians’ private property or farmland. The separation barrier constructed by Israel extends
beyond the Green line to absorb major settlements. The separation barrier, constructed during
the second Intifada under the pretext of decreasing suicide bombings, includes sections of
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fence and heavily fortified concrete wall. It is 450 miles long in total and swallows up 733
square kilometers, or 13% of the West Bank, beyond the Green line. The barrier also obstructs
the movement of goods and labor, hindering a Palestinian economy from thriving.32 In 2004 the
International Court of Justice in The Hague determined that the construction of the security
barrier was in contravention to international law and ruled that Israel must cease construction.
It was concluded that the security barrier violates Palestinian freedom of movement, freedom
of occupation, the rights to health, education, and employment services, and a decent standard
of living. Many in the international community also feared that the construction of the barrier
would predetermine the future border between two states, rather than through negotiation
between the two parties.33
Today, there are 127 settlements officially recognized by the Israeli Ministry of the
Interior, and around 100 which are not recognized by the government, known as “illegal
outposts.” While lacking legitimacy from the Israeli government, these illegal outposts often
still receive governmental support. Much of the land on which settlements sit today was seized
by the army under the pretext of imperative military needs. Today, settlements comprise only
1.7% of the West Bank, and 75-80% of settlers live relatively close to the Green Line in
settlements not extremely intrusive to the West Bank. 34 60% of all settlers live within five
major settlement blocs- Maaleh Adumim, Modiin Ili, Ariel, Gush Etzion, and Givat Ze’ev. Due to
the sizes and populations of these blocs, most of them would likely be annexed to Israel in
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mutually agreed upon land swaps as part of a two-state solution. This was an idea that was
begrudgingly accepted by Yasser Arafat at the Camp David Summit.35
Some settlements are particularly problematic in that they have been strategically built
deep into the West Bank or are otherwise more damaging to a potential two-state solution.
Israeli plans to expand existing settlements and create entirely new ones, and to reroute and
extend the security barrier well beyond the boundaries of existing settlements, will make the
establishment of a contiguous Palestinian state nearly impossible. Ariel is a major settlement
with a population of 25,000 and its own university. It lies 20 kilometers deep into the West
Bank nearly halfway between the Green Line and the Jordan River. Annexation of the Ariel bloc
would make the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state nearly impossible and evacuating
the settlement would cause unforeseen political upheaval in Israel.36
Hebron, while it is the most populated Palestinian city in the West Bank, it also holds
more religious and cultural significance to the Jewish people than any other major settlement.
It holds the Cave of the Patriarchs and Matriarchs, the founding fathers and mothers of
Judaism. Because Islam is also an Abrahamic religion, Hebron holds religious importance to
Muslims, and the Ibrahimi Mosque, where Baruch Goldstein massacred Palestinian
worshippers, is attached to the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Since Israel’s acquisition of the West
Bank in1967, settlers have flocked to Hebron and Kiryat Arba, to reestablish what they viewed
as an indigenous community whose members were massacred in 1929. Kiryat Arba has less
religious and cultural significance, but it holds a large population some of the most religious and
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nationalistic settlers who wish to live close to Hebron. These settlements lie well beyond the
boundaries of the Green Line and an envisioned future border. It would be nearly impossible
for Israel to annex this settlement without severely cutting into major Palestinian
municipalities. 37
The E1 Plan is a plan to build a major settlement comprised of 3,682 housing units east
of Jerusalem, adjacent to the settlement of Maaleh Adumim. If the proposed settlement is
built, it will effectively bisect the West Bank, isolating East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians
seek to be their future capital.38 The construction of E1 and the proposed security barrier route
surrounding it, stretching to 15 kilometers from the Jordan River, would also hinder the viability
and contiguity of a Palestinian state in the West Bank.
While settlement homes have been built and settlers have moved into existing
settlements, a new settlement had not been built in the West Bank from the 1993 Oslo Accords
until March 30th, 2017. On this date the Israeli government approved a plan to begin
construction of the “Ami Chai” (my people live) settlement. Ami Chai is not a part of any major
settlement bloc and is planned to be an alternative home for the evicted settlers of Amona, a
settlement deemed illegal and dismantled due to its being built on what the Israeli Supreme
Court recognized as private Palestinian land.39 This is the first settlement formally established
since 1992, excluding the retroactive legalization of formerly illegal outposts. The legalization of
formerly illegal outposts is a measure which the Palestinians see as a continuation of theft of

37

Nelson, 193
“The E1 Plan and its Implications for Human Rights in the West Bank.” B’Tselem, B’Tselem
39 Settlements.” Jewish Virtual Library
38

Bucksbaum 26

their land, while the Israeli government disputes it. Increased settlement construction under
the Netanyahu government in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has severely hindered the
possibility of the establishment of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state, thereby damaging
the possibility of a two-state solution. The continued construction of existing settlements and
legalization of illegal outposts in area C has advanced a de facto annexation of area C.
Finally, President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel on
December 6th, 2017, and the coinciding plans to move the United States Embassy there from
Tel Aviv, was seen by many Palestinians as a “shot at the heart of the two-state Jerusalem.”40
East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state has been the cornerstone of the twostate solution. Trump’s declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was seen by Palestinians
as validating and normalizing Israel’s control over the entire city, including the eastern half,
which conquered in 1967 and then annexed in 1980 via the Jerusalem Basic Law. 41 No state has
ever given recognition for this annexation. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas responded to
the declaration with harsh rhetoric, spelling what he described as the end of the two-state
solution, and the end to all security and other cooperation with Israel. Following the
declaration, Abbas declared that the Oslo Accords had become irrelevant, and that Israel killed
Oslo. “Today is the day that the Oslo Accords end. Israel killed them.” Even though it was the
Oslo Accords which created the Palestinian National Authority and gave it legitimacy, he went
on to say, “I am saying that Oslo, there is no Oslo.” 42
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A confluence of four factors has led to both increased settlement activity and decreased
viability of the two-state solution. These include an increase in influence by the settler
movement in the Israeli government, perceived American support under the Trump
Administration not previously available under the Obama Administration, the development of
viable alternative solutions, and perhaps most importantly, surreptitious support for Israel from
critical Arab states. Israel’s right-wing government has been emboldened by these factors, and
many members of the current government have begun to push for a more nationalistic and
right-wing agenda, with measures that threaten the viability of a two-state solution. Ministers
of the Knesset (MKs) have pushed for legislation to legalize illegal settlements and outposts, of
which some are on private Palestinian land, and some MKs are attempting to push forward
legislation applying full sovereignty over the West Bank, effectively annexing it to Israeli
territory. These efforts have been blocked for the time being by Prime Minister Netanyahu, for
fear of jeopardizing Israel’s vital relationships with the United States and increasingly, Saudi
Arabia.
Drop in support for two-state solution among Palestinians, Israeli Jews
The consequences of the Jerusalem decision include a drastic decrease in support for
the two-state solution, by both Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research (PCPSR) conducts surveys among different demographic groups,
demonstrating values and support for peace plans based on different conditions and ethnic
groups. For example, it differentiates between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, secular Jews, religious
Jews, and settlers. Among Palestinians, the PCPSR distinguishes between Palestinians living in
Gaza and the West Bank, secular and religious, and based on where they live (cities, villages,
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and refugee camps), and their political affiliation, supporting Hamas, Fatah, third parties, or
unaffiliated. According to the PCPSR, Palestinians and Israelis are moving away from support for
a two-state solution and moving more towards supporting armed struggle or continued
warfare. This trend was also emphasized by Trump’s Jerusalem decision.
Despite the Palestinian response, a plurality of Palestinians, 31.3%, believe that the
situation has not changed at all following Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel. It is followed by 30.5% “the situation has changed a lot.” According to a PCPSR survey,
produced in January 2018, less than half and Palestinians and Israelis, 46% of both populations,
support the two-state solution. The only demographic which remains strongly supportive of it is
Arab citizens of Israel, of whom 83% still support the two-state solution. Jewish Israeli support
has changed little since June of 2017 (it was 47%), but Palestinian support has dropped more
substantially, from 53% in June of 2017.
The same poll determined that 48% of Israelis believe the two-state solution is still
feasible, whereas 42% believe that it is not. Among Palestinians, belief that the two-state
solution is no longer viable has increased substantially since President Trump’s declaration of
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. 60% of Palestinians believe it is no longer a viable option (62%
in the West Bank and 56% in Gaza, with pessimism higher in the West Bank likely due to
settlement expansion), opposed to 37% who believe it still is viable. In total, 73% of Israeli Jews
and 75% of Palestinians do not believe that a Palestinian state will be established in the next
five years. A mere 4% of Palestinians believe the chances of this are high or very high, and 75%,
(increased from 71% last June), say the chances are low or very low. When asked the same
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question, Israelis shared pessimism, with 70% believing the chances to be low or very low
(considering the disparities in attitudes among Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs).
When weighing the options of reaching a peace agreement vs. continuing perpetual
occupation and warfare with one another, attitudes of militancy have increased and support for
reaching a peace agreement has decreased. Among Israelis, 38% chose to reach for a peace
agreement (decrease from 45% June 2017), and between 18% and 19% called for “a definitive
war with the Palestinians,” compared to just 12% in June 2017. Conversely, Israeli support for
the option of one state with apartheid increased from 11% to 15% since June 2017. Within
Israeli society, support for the two-state solution is the lowest among the lowest age group,
and generally increases with age. Among 18-24-year-old Israeli Jews, support for the two-state
solution was at 27%. That number increased to 37% among 25-34-year-olds Israeli Jews,
compared to 54% support among those who are 55 years or older.
Last June 45% of Palestinians supported a peace agreement and 21% preferred armed
struggle. Today, when given three options to choose from, more Palestinians (35%) chose
armed resistance as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to Israel,
whereas 31% chose negotiation and 25% chose non-violent resistance. 48% said they support a
return to an armed intifada (67% in Gaza and 39% in the West Bank). In general, the belief that
there will be an eventual peace is dismal among Palestinians. Only 9% of Palestinians believe
there will be peace between Israel and a Palestinian state in 10 years, and the same for 100
years.43 Due to the perceive infeasibility of the two-state solution, different ideas to solve the
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conflict are being considered. However, given a decrease in support of the two-state solution
due to recent events, both Israeli and Palestinians support the two-state solution over possible
alternatives to solving the conflict: one state with equal rights for all, and one state without
equal rights, amounting to apartheid.
Alternatives to the Two-State Solution
Israelis and Palestinians have been looking towards other solutions to the conflict,
considering the evident impasse of the two-state solution, such as a one-state or binational
state solution, or more creative ideas, such as the “Palestinian Emirates” plan. One of the most
commonly discussed ideas for resolving the conflict is the eventual establishment of one binational state in which all citizens live equally under the law and with equal rights. As of 2017,
the number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is 4,952,168. This is split with 3,008,770
in the West Bank and 1,943,398 in the Gaza strip.44 Unlike Israeli authorities, the Palestinian
Authority considers Palestinians in the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem as citizens of the
West Bank. When added to the nearly 1.5 million Palestinians living in Israel, the total number
of Palestinians in the entire land nearly approaches the slim Jewish majority. Israelis fear that
absorbing the West Bank and Gaza strip, and all its inhabitants, will accelerate the demographic
demise of the Jewish state. Jews would be outnumbered by Arabs near instantly. Arguing in
favor of annexation of the territories without giving the Palestinians full rights would be
inherently creating an undemocratic society. Either way, Israel would lose its Jewish or
democratic character.
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Palestinian opponents of the bi-national solution come from many sides of the political
spectrum. Many prefer the two-state solution over this idea. Only 28% of Palestinians support a
one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights, of which 69% are
opposed.45 Some Palestinian opponents to this solution also argue that recognizing the Jewish
people as a nation, thus comparing them to the Palestinian people as a nation, is wrong. This is
based on the argument that a religious group is not necessarily a national group, and the two in
this case should not be treated as the same. Many Jews would dispute this, arguing that the
Jewish people constitute a nation and are entitled to their right to independent identification
and self-determination.46 Palestinian supporters of the bi-national state argue that the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel is no longer a practical
option.
Other critics of the idea see it as a vehicle for indefinite Israeli control over the
Palestinians and an inevitable undemocratic society, resembling apartheid. Former Secretary of
State John Kerry stated in a press conference “Here is a fundamental reality: if the choice is one
state, Israel can either be Jewish or democratic- it cannot be both- and it won ’t ever really be
at peace. Moreover, the Palestinians will never fully realize their vast potential in a homeland of
their own with a one-state solution.”47 Essentially, Kerry outlines that one state for two peoples
is not in the best interest of anyone. This is contestable, as Israelis would argue that a one-state
solution, with the state keeping its democratic nature, would benefit the Palestinians more, and
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give them essentially what many of them have desired all along, their entire historic homeland
back.
Other ideas, have been proposed by Israelis, for which the purposes of many are to
retain as much control over the West Bank in any future scenario as possible. A proposal which
has been coined by a prominent Israeli researcher is the Palestinian Emirates plan. Dr.
Mordechai Kedar, the architect of this plan, is an Israeli scholar of Arabic culture and is fluent in
English, Arabic, and Hebrew. He is an expert on Israel’s Arab population and Arab society. It is
Dr. Kedar’s belief that the Western style nation-state structure which was imposed on much of
the Arab world after WWI is an unsuitable government structure for the region. Kedar argues
that creating an artificial Palestinian state, which would require uprooting Jewish families
where no Arab population currently exists would lead to indefensible borders for the Jewish
homeland. He claims that multi-national societies such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen are
failing due to this government structure’s incompatibility with the natural societal order of the
Middle East. Because the tribe or clan is the cornerstone of society, Kedar believes, the
governance of society should be with local tribes, families, or clans, not some overreaching
authority governing citizens of many different families and tribes. He cites the success of the
United Arab Emirates, being a series of homogenous tribes, as proof for this theory. Dr. Kedar
believes that Palestinian society would be governed more efficiently if it utilized this model. The
“Palestinian Emirates” would be comprised of eight autonomous Emirates in the most densely
populated Arab areas in the West Bank and Gaza, considering that nearly all Palestinians live in
city-centers in Areas A and B of the West Bank… Kedar claims that due to tribal rifts and local
patriotism there will never be a successful unity government among the Palestinian Arab
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population centers in Judea and Samaria or Gaza… The eight city-states would comprise the
areas of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Tul Karem, Kalkilya, the Arab part of Hebron and the
Gaza strip. Residents would become citizens of these eight independent countries. Any Arab
leadership that attempts to circumvent or dominate the development of these Palestinian
Emirates would inhibit a future security and economic opportunity for the citizens of these
eight independent countries. The Palestinian Emirates vision is a viable alternative based on the
Arab sociology of tribalism in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. Kedar believes that this initiative will
bring about a stable peace to the region and added security for Israel. With areas A and B
becoming Palestinian sovereign territory, Israel would annex area C. 48 This is the most
noticeable flaw to his plan. Any proposal which involves Israeli annexation of Area C is going to
be difficult to gain support among the Palestinians, especially the ones who live there would
need to either relocate and declare allegiance to one of the Palestinian city-states or become
citizens of Israel.
Another potential scenario, one that is less discussed as viable solution to the conflict or
an ideal one, is the maintenance of the status quo. Should all other options fail, this will be the
direction which continues until drastic changes further advance the prospects for real peace.
Israel can continue to occupy a large majority of the West Bank and Gaza on the grounds of
security and terror prevention. The Palestinians in both territories would continue to resist,
including using terrorism, and groups like Hamas would continue to gain support. The cyclical
violence and the conflict could simply continue perpetually.
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Regional Dynamics Changing, Mutual Threats Creating New Alliances
In the 25 years since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the situation on the ground has
changed drastically. Regional alliances, strategic interests, and priorities have changed. The
threat of an increasingly aggressive Iran and the shift in the regional balance of power has
created mutual interests between Israel and many of its long-time adversaries, to a point where
there is visible cooperation and undiplomatic relations. An ideal settlement on behalf of the
Palestinians is becoming less of a priority to some players in the region, and the increasing
relationships between Israel and the Arab states is sure to affect what an eventual peace
agreement will entail. The obstacles to a two-state solution which have grown over the years
have not rendered it completely infeasible, however the “ideal” two-state solution for many is
no longer ideal for the Palestinians. The growing relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia
and the mutual strategic interests between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan are unprecedented. Saudi
Arabia seeks to recruit Israeli power and intelligence in its fight against Iranian expansionism.
Israel and Egypt are cooperatively fighting terrorism in Egypt’s territory, and Jordan relies on
Israel now more than ever for its supply of water and partnership in crucial projects like
replenishing the Dead Sea. Primarily due to unprecedented and surreptitious support for Israel
from these critical Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan are more likely to push the
Palestinians toward accepting a solution which offers them much less than what they have
always demanded.
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Impact of the JCPOA
The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 emboldened Iran
and shifted the balance of power in the Middle East. An influx of money for the Iranian regime
boosted its economy and allowed it to continue its bountiful spending on foreign proxies and
military adventurism. Also known as the Iranian Nuclear Deal, its inception marked the
beginning of increased yet covert cooperation between Israel and many Sunni Arab states, led
by Saudi Arabia. The JCPOA, also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was signed by the Obama
Administration, Iran, and the rest of the Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and
Germany in 2015. The deal was pushed by the Obama administration to curb Iran’s nuclear
program. This deal changed the dynamics of the Middle East and changed the course of
regional alliances as well as the direction of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Whether intentionally or
unintentionally, the deal succeeded in bringing the Arab states, and primarily Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states, and Israel closer in covert cooperation amid a perceived mutual threat of
Iran. Iran posed and continues to pose threats to Israel and the Sunni Arab states from its
nuclear program- which is viewed by them as insufficient in preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon- as well as Iran’s ballistic missile program. Additionally, Iran’s regional
expansion by means of its militant proxy groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Assad regime in
Syria, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen pose a significant threat to Israel and other Arab states. A
nuclear Iran also has the potential of starting a nuclear arms race among the Arab states. Saudi
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officials have explicitly said that should Iran develop nuclear weapons; Saudi Arabia would
immediately follow suit.49
Israel and the Saudi-led GCC were both staunch critics of the Iran deal prior to its
signing. They believed the deal didn’t do enough to prompt the regime to end its support for
terror organizations, human rights abuses, and its ballistic missile program, in violation of U.N.
Security Council resolutions. The implementation of the JCPOA gave the Islamic Republic $100
billion in unfrozen assets, in addition to a decades-old financial settlement of $1.7 billion.
Because of the sanction relief by the U.S. and E.U., the country was also open to international
commercial and investment activity. As the critics of the deal suspected, much of this money
continued to be funneled into Iran’s proxies such as the Assad regime, Hezbollah in Lebanon,
the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq, continuing to destabilize the region, as
well as the acceleration of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.50 After the
implementation of the deal Iran intensified its efforts to bolster the Syrian regime, using the
airline Mahan Air to transfer weapons and IRGC servicemen to Syria.51 In addition, it is
presumed that as the deal is set to expire in 2025, Iran will then be able to restart their nuclear
ambitions from a much greater economic position than before. Having explicitly promised to
withdraw from the agreement while running for president, President Trump is to decide by May
12th if the United States will remain a signatory of the agreement. The Trump Administration
would like to see many revisions if not a full withdrawal from the deal (some of which are
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nonstarters for the Iranian regime, such as strengthening inspections at any suspect site inside
Iran and adding a provision on its ballistic missile testing and activity.) The Trump
Administration would also like to more directly confront Iran’s cyber-attacks, human-rights
abuses, and support for terrorism and military adventurism. The U.S. withdrawing from the deal
or proposing harsh revisions the regime would never agree to, would likely result in Iran
restarting its nuclear weapons program, increasing the likelihood of Israeli military action to
prevent this. Seeking to maintain its qualitative military edge and a monopoly on nuclear
weapons in the region (though it is not officially admitted that Israel has nuclear weapons it is
widely believed to be so), Israel has in the past taken preemptive military action to prevent
states from developing such weaponry. Israel bombed suspected nuclear reactors in Iraq and
Syria in 1981 and 2007, respectively, and has taken covert and overt action to prevent Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons in Iran and Syria.52
Iran’s support for the Assad regime as well as Hezbollah acting on behalf of Assad in
Syria has allowed Iranian-friendly forces, as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) to firmly establish a presence in Syria, inching closer to Israel’s borders. Iran has long
sought to create a land corridor from Tehran to Beirut, allowing for easier transport of men and
weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the words of Ali Akbar Velayti, Senior Advisor for Foreign
Affairs to Iran’s Supreme Leader, “The chain of resistance against Israel by Iran, Syria,
Hezbollah, the new Iraqi government and Hamas passes through the Syrian highway… Syria is
the golden ring of the chain of resistance against Israel.”53
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Increase in Saudi-Israeli Cooperation
The overt and covert relationship between the Saudi-led Gulf states and Israel due to
the threat of Iran has changed the direction of Israeli-Palestinian peace. The need to obtain a
just peace deal based on the traditional framework of a fair two-state solution is becoming less
of a priority for Israel and the Arab states. The desire for expanding cooperation between the
two is becoming more important than the issue of solving the conflict, for both Israel and the
Arab state. Israel and the Arab states both face severe threats from Iranian ambitions and
proxies along their borders, and potentially with a future nuclear Iran with increased missile
capabilities. Now, with the Trump administration in office in the United States, added to
increasingly friendly relations with Egypt and growing covert cooperation with Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf states, the prospects for a just two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
becoming less and less likely. What is likely to come from this developing alliance is a peace
deal which is less balanced between Israeli and Palestinian interests, and will be heavily favored
towards Israel, for the sake of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations and continuing to normalize
and formalize an anti-Iranian alliance.
Israel’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has transformed throughout the last half century.
In the 1950s Saudi Arabia’s founding father, King Saud liked to declare that “Israeli is to the
entire Arab world like a cancer to the human body, and the only way of remedy is to uproot it
just like a cancer…” King Fiasal, years, later, often presented his guests with copies of The
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, an anti-Semitic forgery used by the Nazis, among other things, as
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a justification for genocide against the Jews.54 Decades later, amid a changing landscape in the
Middle East and an unlikely alliance growing, the rhetoric of former Saudi regimes towards
Israel is now history. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman said to an interviewer from The
Atlantic, in an unprecedented step in Saudi history or that of the Arab world entirely, that Israel
has a right to live in peace alongside the Palestinians. He recognized the Jewish state’s right to
exist, without requiring the traditional two-state solution as a precursor, as was stipulated by
the Arab Peace Initiative.55 The Palestinians are not naïve to this developing warming of
relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. 70% of Palestinians believe there is an Arab Sunni
alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land.56

The evidence for Saudi-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation is strong and it is
indisputable. Using its proxies in Lebanon and Yemen, Iran has increased its presence on both
Israel’s and Saudi Arabia’s borders. With the help of the Russian intervention in Syria and
Hezbollah and other Iranian-sponsored ground forces, the Assad regime has begun to retake
large swaths of territory, including nearing the 1974 Armistice lines near Israel’s Golan Heights
border. In recent years Iranian or related forces have begun establishing bases and military
positions approaching dangerously close to Israel’s border, which Israel treats as a red line.
Israel has often having struck Iranian positions to prevent further entrenchment. Iran has yet to
seriously buildup threatening capabilities in Southern Syria, in part due to Israeli strikes on
Hezbollah weapons convoys, suspected Iranian bases, and weapons factories. Israel will
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continue these actions to prevent Iran from maintaining a permanent presence in Syria like that
of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
Israeli defense and intelligence officials cite the threat of Hezbollah in the northern front
as the greatest current threat to Israel’s security, not a massive insurrection of Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli officials have been noting Hezbollah’s provocative actions and
threatened to engage if necessary. Other sources of recent tension between Israel and
Hezbollah are an Israeli-planned border fence along the Lebanese border and Lebanese
offshore gas and drilling in disputed maritime waters, an area called Block 9, which closely
borders Israeli waters. Hezbollah has threatened to strike Israel’s oil facilities if it interferes with
Lebanese off-shore energy. The increased military capabilities of Israel and Hezbollah since
2006, rhetoric from both Israeli and Hezbollah officials, and the increased scope of the conflict
have signaled that the next Lebanese-Israeli war will be far more devastating than the last. Also,
the next war will likely be fought on a larger “northern front” in both Lebanon and Syria, given
Iran’s recent entrenchment in territories deemed too close for comfort by Israel.

The IDF estimates that Hezbollah currently possesses approximately 150,000 rockets;
Katyushas with a range of 7-24 miles to Scud missiles with a range of 420 miles. About 1,000 of
these have precision-guided capabilities. Hezbollah has also acquired remotely guided aircraft
(drones). For perspective, during Israel’s most recent war with Hamas in 2014, Operation
Protective Edge, Hamas fired approximately 4,500 rockets into Israel during the 50-day conflict.
With Hezbollah’s newly refreshed arsenal and capabilities, in the next confrontation, the group
could fire nearly 4,500 rockets per day for about a month. Most of Hezbollah’s arms depots and
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rocket launchers are dispersed amongst civilian towns and villages throughout Lebanon,
primarily in the south, increasing the potential devastation of a third Lebanese war. 57
Saudi Arabia expressed its support for Israel in the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah. On the
second day of the war, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal declared ‘there is a difference
between legitimate resistance and miscalculated adventurism’.58 Other Saudi criticisms of
fellow Arabs fighting Israel marked a strategic difference in Israeli-Saudi relations and reflected
the Kingdom’s deep fears of increasing Iranian influence.
Tensions escalating along the Israeli-Lebanese, Israeli-Syrian, and Saudi-Yemeni borders
are actively increasing the likelihood of Israeli-Arab cooperation against Iran and its proxies.
Israel and Saudi Arabia now share a mutual interest in curbing Iranian influence by weakening
its proxies Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria. Indeed,
a spokesman for the Houthi rebels has said that the rebels would be ready to fight Israel
alongside Hezbollah.59 Israeli officials have admitted to sharing intelligence with the Saudicoalition states regarding arms shipments to these various players. “Much more is going on
now than any time in the past,” said Israel’s Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz in an interview,
referring to Israel’s relations with Gulf states. “It’s almost a revolution in the Middle East.”60 In
an unprecedented move, Israeli military Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot told the Saudi newspaper
Elaph that Israel was ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on mutual interests. Specifically, he
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said that Israel would be willing to share critical information with the kingdom on regional
security.61 These steps signal significant growth in the relationship, and a strong likelihood of
future cooperation. Saudi Arabia also just recently ruled to allow India Air to fly to Tel Aviv over
Saudi airspace, enthusing Israelis and individuals looking for further expansion in relations.62
Israel has also reportedly been selling arms and drones to the U.A.E., and the two countries
recently took part in the same air force exercise in Greece, along with the U.S., Italy, the U.K,
and Cyprus.6364 Regional cooperation between Israel and the Saudi-led Gulf states is
undoubtedly increasing. Speaking at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C., Saudi Foreign
Minister Adel al-Jubeir said that Israel and the Kingdom had “a commonality of interests.”
However, he added that this “does not mean we have to have diplomatic relations.” He also
stressed that Saudi Arabia would prefer to establish formal relations with Israel only after a
peace accord is signed, and not before.65 However, the desire for more regional cooperation
between Israel and Saudi Arabia has created more pressure for an alternative solution to the
two-state solution.
It is not just the Saudi government and Crown Prince Mohamad bin Salman which are
warming up to Israel. Because of the conflict in Yemen between the Saudis and Iran’s proxy
Houthi rebels, Saudi citizens now view Iran as their main adversary, over Israel. A poll
conducted by the Israeli Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Institute for Policy and Strategy found
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that 18% of Saudis viewed Israel as their principle enemy; 22 believed ISIS to be their main
enemy and a significant 53% chose Iran.66 Iran’s support for the Houthis is increasingly visible. It
considers the Houthis, along with Hezbollah and its Shia proxies in Iraq, Syria, and gulf countries
to be the “axis of resistance,” resistance to American imperialism and Sunni dominance in the
region. On January 25th, 2015, cleric Ali Shirazi, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the
IRGC, stated: “Hezbollah was formed in Lebanon as a popular force like Basij [Iran’s militia].
Similarly, popular forces were also formed in Syria and Iraq, and today we are watching the
formation of Ansar Allah in Yemen.67 Saudi Arabia’s anti-Houthi coalition (the U.A.E., Kuwait,
Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Sudan) is facing similar threats to Israel, with
regards to Iranian proxy groups increasing in strength along its border, firing Irian-provided
weapons into its territory. Like Israel and its blockage of Gaza, Saudi Arabia has effectively
blockaded Yemen, which has intensified the already dire humanitarian crisis there. The threats
to Israeli and Saudi security posed by Hezbollah and the Houthis far surpass that of the
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Because of this, much of the Israelis’ diplomatic and
intelligence efforts will be more focused on preventing another war with the group than
achieving a peace deal, or at least one which is too compromising to Israeli security, with the
Palestinians.
In addition to expanding and normalizing covert security cooperation in the fight against
groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other forces in Iraq and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel
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also share a desire to expand partnership through joint-economic projects. Israeli companies
have expressed interest in investing in the proposed Saudi mega-city NEOM, a major project
which is to accompany an array of reforms meant to liberalize and modernize Saudi Arabia, as
per the Kingdom’s 2030 Vision. This proposed city is planned to be 26,000 square kilometers
and built on the corner of the Red Sea neighboring Jordan, and close to Israel and Egypt. A
bridge is rumored to be built from the Saudi coast at NEOM to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, and it is
highly feasible that this plan for a major tourist attraction includes the vision of Israeli tourists
as well as investors. Prominent Israeli businessperson Erel Margalit told the Jerusalem Post in
an interview that ““Prince Mohammed bin Salman has come up with a project of regional
cooperation … It gives an invitation to the Israelis to speak for regional economic cooperation
through the concept of innovation.”68
There is also historical precedence for major Arab states like Saudi Arabia to make peace
and even normalize relations with Israel without a comprehensive resolution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem in November 1977,
breaking from every Arab country. The peace treaty that followed, signed by himself and Israeli
Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1979, was accompanied by an agreement on a “framework”
for settling the West Bank question and the “Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”69 This deal
was able to be made because Egypt’s desire to regain the Sinai Peninsula from Israel
outweighed the Palestinian problem. Therefore, it is not implausible that a country as
historically adversarial as Saudi Arabia to put its own agenda ahead of the plight of the
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Palestinians and take advantage of its growing mutual interests with Israel. Through the actions
and words of Saudi officials, including the Crown Prince, the establishment of a working antiIranian alliance including Israel is more of a priority to Saudi Arabia than settling the conflict in a
way which the Palestinians receive all their historic demands for peace.
Increase in Israeli-Egyptian Cooperation
Israel and Egypt have increased security and economic cooperation in recent years to an
unprecedented level. Israel and Egypt have been collaboratively fighting the Islamic State in
Sinai or “State of Sinai.” In February of 2018 the New York Times reported that “for more than
two years, unmarked Israeli drones, helicopters, and jets have carried out a covert air
campaign, conducting more than 100 airstrikes inside Egypt, frequently more than once a
week- and all with the approval of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.70 Egypt also shares Israel’s
desire for a stable Gaza, fearing that the “Great March of Return” and the glorification of
Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood-inspired groups may cause unrest on Egyptian streets.
For this, Israel and Egypt share an interest in empowering the Palestinian Authority and
weakening Hamas, using the opening of the crucial Rafah crossing as a bargaining chip with
Hamas.
Another indication of increasing Egyptian complicity with Israel and the American
sponsored peace plan was the Egyptian government’s reaction to President Trump’s
declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. It was uncovered by the New York Times that
the Egyptian military followed the announcement by urging popular talk show hosts, which

70

Kirkpatrick, David K. “Secret Alliance: Israel Carries Out Airstrikes in Egypt, With Cairo’s O.K.” The New York Times, The New
York Times, 3 Feb. 2018

Bucksbaum 46

hold large influence in Egyptian media, to downplay the Jerusalem decision, and persuade their
audiences to accept it. In a phone conversation obtained by the Times, Egyptian Army Captain
Ashraf al-Kholi asked “How is Jerusalem different from Ramallah, really?” 71 These signs show
that the Egyptian government is less concerned about the future of the Palestinians’ aspirations
for a capital in Jerusalem than ever before. Also, in a momentous sign of increased economic
cooperation with Israel, An Egyptian gas company recently signed a 10-year contract for the
importation of $15 billion in natural gas from Israel, despite outcry from Egyptians and
Palestinians.72 With the current situation in the Sinai and Egypt’s need for natural resources, a
friendly and working relationship with Israel has been prioritized over the Palestinian issue or
finding a permanent settlement to the conflict, at least temporarily.
President Al-Sisi’s transferring control of the Tiran and Sanafir Islands in the Red Sea to
Saudi Arabia was also signaled an increase in cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia, against
the interest of the Palestinians. Israeli Knesset member Tzachi Hanegb said about the transfer
of control “The Saudis, who are committed to freedom of shipping under international law, will
not harm the essence of the agreement between Egypt and us in this regard, and freedom of
shipping in Aqaba and Eilat will remain as is” (Williams 2016). Regarding the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said “there is an agreement and
commitments that Egypt accepted related to these islands, and the kingdom is committed to
these.”73 Egypt under President Al-Sisi is proving to be cooperative with Israel and Saudi

71Kirkpatrick,

David K. “Tapes Reveal Egyptian Leaders’ Tacit Acceptance of Jerusalem Move” The New York Times, The New
York Times, 6 Jan. 2018
72 Feldman, Shai, and Tamara Cofman Wittes. “Why Everyone Loves Israel Now.” Brookings, Brookings, 26 Mar. 2018
73Totten, Michael J. “The New Arab-Israeli Alliance.” World Affairs, Vol. 197, no. 2, 2016, pp. 28-36

Bucksbaum 47

Arabia’s interests. Because of Egypt’s current struggle with Islamic State-inspired groups in the
northern Sinai, it is far more concerned with increasing regional economic and security
cooperation than with achieving a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Egypt will
likely support a deal proposed by the American administration, which is likely to be heavily
biased in favor of Israel.
Critical Israeli-Jordanian cooperation
Israel and Jordan are in diplomatic talks regarding the mutually beneficial Red Sea-Dead
Sea pipeline. The ambitious project, meant to slow and eventually reverse the increasing
degradation of the Dead Sea, has created joint efforts. For example, the two countries are
working together on the physical Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline, meant to replenish the
diminishing Dead Sea from the Red Sea. In the first phase of the project, 300 million cubic
meters of water will be pumped into the Dead Sea each year. In the next phase, the project will
see 2 billion cubic meters of seawater transferred annually, according to Jordan’s Water and
Irrigation Ministry. The project is also to include a desalination plant with a capacity of 6585mcm per year near Aqaba, using Israeli technology. The project is mutually beneficial, and
experts say water levels in the Dead Sea have been falling at a rate of one meter each year,
warning that it could completely dry out within 30 years.74 Talks regarding the project were
stalled last year following incident last year in which an Israeli security guard killed two
Jordanians near the Israeli Embassy in Amman, resulting in a diplomatic standoff. Despite the
diplomatic obstacles, the project is seen as essential to the region given the economic and
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environmental circumstances, and would be unquestionably beneficial to Israel, Jordan, and the
Palestinian Authority. 75 In addition to sharing water resources, Jordan is a strategic partner on
which Israel must to rely on to keep Sunni radical terrorists, including the Islamic State, away
from its eastern border. Islamic State has a presence on the southern end on Israel’s Golan
border in the northwest, and it is crucial that the Hashemite Kingdom and Israel work together
to prevent it from gaining a presence in Jordan. Jordan has also sent strong signals to the
Palestinian Authority expressing their position. Jordan is in the process of revoking the
Jordanian citizenship of 30 top PA officials, including President Abbas, likely to pressure the PA
to return to the negotiating table with the United States.76 For Jordan, a strong partnership
with Israel in keeping Islamic State from threatening its regime takes priority over achieving the
“just” two-state solution it has always sought on behalf of the Palestinians.
The Trump Administration, Israeli, and Palestinian Leadership
Formulating a peace deal which could work for Israelis, Palestinians, the Arab states,
and the Trump Administration, is reliant on the actions of the stability and future of Israeli and
Palestinian leadership, and the Trump Administration. The Israeli government led by Benjamin
Netanyahu’s Likud Party coalition is very fragile. Compounded with Netanyahu’s possible future
indictment for corruption charges, the stability of his government threatens the feasibility of
any peace deal proposed by the United States. The Trump Administration and regional players
like Mohammad bin Salman need a Palestinian leadership which will be flexible and agree to a
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deal that does not meet all or many of the Palestinians’ demands. Figures in the Trump
Administration responsible for formulating his Middle East policy, including his son-in-law and
adviser Jared Kushner and ambassador to Israel David Friedman, are also important, as are their
futures in the administration. Actions of the Trump Administration, the Israeli and Palestinian
governments have demonstrated that the traditional two-state solution and its respective
components regarding Jerusalem, refugees, and other issues, has become more unrealistic.
The Trump Administration
In contrast to the chilly relationship with the Obama Administration, the overt bias
favoring Israel is visible in the history of the Trump Foundation and the people President Trump
has included in his Middle East peace envoy. His friendliness towards Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
hostility towards Iran and the JCPOA were visible in his campaign.
In 2003 the Trump Foundation donated $10,000 to schools in the religious West Bank
settlement of Beit El. President Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner’s family
foundation has also made charitable donations to West Bank settlements. Between 2011 and
2013 the gifts totaled $58,500. These donations were made mostly to schools and religious
yeshivas. The Kushner’s also donated $5,000 to the Etzion Foundation, which provides funds for
Yeshivas and other schools in Gush Etzion, in 2012, and $10,000 in 2013. They also gave $5,000
in 2011 to Ohr Torah Stone, a group of schools headquartered in the settlement of Efrat. In
addition, they donated $500 to the Od Yosef Chai Yeshiva in the settlement of Yizhar in 2012.
Yizhar is near the Palestinian city of Nablus, and Jewish extremists from the settlement have
launched violent attacks against Palestinians and Israeli security forces.
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Trump’s Ambassador to Israel David Friedman served as the president of the group
American Friends of Bet El (AFBE), which received $10,000 from the Kushner family in 2011 and
$28,000 in 2013. Friedman is the president of the Beit El Yeshiva’s fundraising arm. David
Friedman has called the two-state solution “an illusion” for a “non-existent problem.” He is also
a frequent contributor to the Israeli right-wing newspaper Arutz Sheva based in Beit El and
partially funded by AFBE. In his op-ed pieces, he has frequently called for settlement expansion
and advocated against a Palestinian state. 77
The Palestinian public in general does not trust the American administration to be an
honest broker for negotiations, especially after the declaration to recognize Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital. Of Palestinians interviewed by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey
Research, 88% view the US as biased in favor of Israel, and 65% are opposed to the resumption
of contacts with the administration that were suspended last December following the
Jerusalem declaration. A slim majority of 51% say that if the US submits a peace plan, the socalled “deal of the century,” the PA should reject it regardless of its content.78
The recent appointments of Mike Pompeo to Secretary of State and John Bolton to
National Security Advisor have guaranteed an even more hawkish administration than
previously. The two officials have staunch anti-Iranian views and will further promote the idea
of a Saudi-Israeli-American alliance against Iran. What is the most practical option for the
immediate future of peace talks is an interim agreement (in-lieu of a less-likely final-status
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agreement) which expands Palestinian Authority control over more of the West Bank and all of
Gaza, continues to preserve Israel’s security needs, and allows Israel to retain control over key
settlements, but otherwise cease settlement activity. This is in the best interest of the Trump
Administration, the Arab states, and would be acceptable for Israel. While it is not a final-status
agreement, an interim agreement would allow the Arab states time and political reason to
make certain gestures of normalization with Israel. This would be the most progress, even if it
makes very little difference, seen by the parties since 1993.
Implications of the Jerusalem Decision
President Trump’s decision to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and
announce the beginning of the process to move the American embassy there from Tel Aviv, was
a significant step towards reigniting the Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt-led regional peace
process, with special focus on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Israelis generally supported the US decision. The Israel Democracy Institute found that
65% of the Jewish public thought that the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel was in Israel’s best interest. Regarding the future of the city and its possible division as
part of a peace process with the Palestinians, 72% believe that the city should remain united
and the capital of Israel, even in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement. Surprisingly,
only 44% of the Arab-Israeli population would like to see the city divided into east and west,
serving as two capitals for two states.79 As of writing, the American administration has made
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the ambitious claim that it will move the American Embassy to Jerusalem by May 14 th, 2018, to
commemorate Israel’s 70th anniversary of statehood.80
As was to be expected, this was a largely unpopular decision among Palestinians. The
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, a Palestinian NGO based in Ramallah, West Bank,
produced a study published in February 2018 showing the extent to which Palestinians
condemned this decision and were largely upset with the general Arab response to it. According
to the survey conducted by the JMCC, 96.1% reject the establishment of a Palestinians state
without Jerusalem as its capital under any circumstances, while only 3% accept the
establishment of a Palestinian state without Jerusalem as its capital under any circumstances.
The Saudi reaction was noticeably half-hearted. King Salman, arguably the most
influential Arab leader in the region, denounced Trump’s decision. However, it had been
reported that the kingdom had been urging Palestinian President Abbas to accept a watereddown peace plan, which might not have included East Jerusalem as a future capital of Palestine.
During the protests which followed Trump’s announcement, Palestinians in Beit Hanoun, Gaza,
burned American, Israeli, and Saudi flags.81 However, despite condemnations from virtually
every Arab and Muslim world leader of the Trump administration’s decision, Palestinians
viewed the overall Arab response as insufficient. When asked how satisfied they were with the
Arab world’s response, 73.4% of Palestinians claimed to be either “very dissatisfied” or
“somewhat dissatisfied” opposed to 24.4% who were either “very satisfied” or “somewhat
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satisfied.”82 During the April protests along the Gaza border meant to reaffirm the Palestinians’
right to return to their homes inside Israel, Palestinians burned photos of Mohammad bin
Salman, in addition to Israeli and American flags.83
The Palestinian Authority responded harshly to this decision, effectively cutting ties with
the American administration. The Palestinian Authority announced its intent to boycott the U.S.
administration and to refuse to accept it as a broker of peace talks in the future. The PLO
Central Council recommended to the PLO Executive Committee that it suspend its recognition
of Israel and halt security cooperation with Israeli security forces. However, Palestinians lack
confidence in the PA’s willingness to take such measures. Some 55.7% of Palestinians polled did
not expect the decisions to be implemented, and 54% expressed that they expect the
Palestinian leadership to backtrack on its decision to boycott the U.S. administration and not
accept it as a mediator in peace talks.
Future of Israeli Leadership
The ability of Israeli leadership to negotiate a solution is threatened by two factors- the
fragility of the current Likud coalition and the likelihood that a successor to Benjamin
Netanyahu will be less flexible and conciliatory. Though not much is publicly known of the
details of the Trump Administration’s peace plan, the implementation of any peace plan is also
heavily dependent on the stability of the current Israeli government. The current Likud-led
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government is a coalition of six parties (Likud, Jewish Home, Kulanu, Shas, United Torah
Judaism, and Yisrael Beiteinu) and holds a total of 66 out of 120 seats in the Knesset.84
The recommendation by the Israeli Chief of Police that the Attorney General indict
Netanyahu for a series of corruption charges, including bribery, fraud, and breach of public
trust, risk jeopardizing any regional peace deal brought forth by the U.S. However, given the
lengthy process which it would take to indict the Prime Minister, and the months of legal
battles which would follow, it is unlikely that he will be indicted and arrested in the foreseeable
future. In addition, “Mr. Security” Netanyahu is still widely popular among Israelis. He will
continue to rule with the support the Israeli public if the threat of terror or an aggressive Iran
remains. At this time, with the increase in tensions along the Lebanese, Syrian, and Gaza
borders, Israelis will continue to support their Prime Minister. An Israeli poll taken after the
publication of the Chief of Police’s recommendation found that if new elections were held
immediately, Neyanyahu’s Likud party would gain one Knesset seat, from 25 to 26, and Yesh
Atid, the main opposition party, would lose two seats.85
However, Netanyahu must still tread lightly while among his own party members. His
right-wing government is very fragile, and at risk of collapse due to highly contested issues
within the coalition (such as the Ultra-Orthodox draft bill and the conversion bill, both highly
disputed between religious and non-religious parties.) Due to the fragility of his coalition and
his own vulnerability brought by the police recommendations of indictment, Netanyahu is
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unlikely to make serious concessions in a proposed peace deal. To make too many or overly
large concessions to the Palestinians (which might be perceived as compromising to Israeli
security) will likely be exploited by his rivals and possible successors. Given its dominance of the
government, the next Israeli Prime Minister is likely to come from the Likud Party, or an MK in
his cabinet who belong to other party in the government coalition. The most likely candidates
are Netanyahu’s Defense Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, Education Minister Naftali Bennet,
Economy Minister Moshe Kahalon, Minister of Public Security and Information Gilad Erdan, or
former minister and Likud insider Gideon Sa’ar.
Should the next Prime Minister be one of these Likud or other Coalition party members,
the likelihood of Israeli concessions or cooperation in a regional peace plan would become even
slimmer. The only people who could possibly succeed Netanyahu are less likely to make any
sort of territorial or other concessions to the Palestinians, let alone accept the establishment of
a sovereign Palestinian state. For the MKs in Netanyahu’s inner circle, and those who will likely
end up replacing him, regional peace and cooperation are far less important than maintaining
security on all fronts, and as much control of the West Bank as possible. Lawmakers like Naftali
Bennet openly propose annexing Area C, or at least a large portion of the West Bank, to include
all settlers currently residing there. Under this plan, 96% of Palestinians would live under PA
rule and the remainder would be given Israeli citizenship.
Since the start of 2018, Knesset members have been attempting to pass legislation to
increase Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank and make future negotiations more difficult.
Netanyahu has been blocking most of these attempts, including those to specifically apply
Israeli sovereignty to Israeli settlements, academic institutions, and the Jordan Valley, and to
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retroactively legalize illegal and unrecognized settlements. Major unilateral moves such as
these would isolate Israel from the U.S. and Arab states and would jeopardize any future peace
plans. The Knesset passed a law requiring any vote to cede any part of Jerusalem to any foreign
power to have 80/120 votes, instead of the traditional 60. This law, an amendment to the Law
on Jerusalem, make it more difficult to relinquish any part of the city to a foreign power under
any future peace deal.86
Netanyahu is on track to become the country’s longest serving Prime Minister,
surpassing the country’s founder, David ben Gurion, in 2019. Netanyahu is hawkish on Israeli
security, but he is willing to make certain concessions, even with his debilitating circumstances.
Should Netanyahu be indicted and replaced by a fellow party or coalition member, there are
few options as to who would be a good candidate that will make the same concessions as part
of a peace deal. Ideological hardliners to his right will be less likely to make any significant
concessions and will be less likely to comply or cooperate with the Trump Administration’s
vision for Middle East peace.
Future of Palestinian Leadership
Last November, Mohammad bin Salman invited Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to
Riyadh, to discuss primarily Iran, the reconciliation effort with Hamas, and restarting peace
negotiations with Israel. Abbas had been attempting to drum up regional support for the
reconciliation deal and obtain much needed political and economic backing from gulf countries
like Saudi Arabia. It was rumored that during Abbas’ trip to Riyadh the Crown Prince essentially
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gave him an ultimatum: “either accept the terms [of president Trump’s peace plan] - no
Jerusalem, no right of return - or make way for somebody who will.”87 It is in the best interest
of Saudi Arabia that the Palestinian Authority cooperate with it and its regional ambitions, and
should an Abbas-led government not comply, it runs the risk of being replaced by a government
more willing to accept President Trump’s watered down peace proposal, heavily in favor of
Israel. Due to the urgency of the emerging anti-Iranian alliance with Trump and Israel, it has
become the primary objective of Saudi Arabia to achieve any sort of peace deal possible at this
time. Cooperation with Israel and combatting Iranian expansion is a bigger priority for Saudi
Arabia currently than the well-being of the Palestinians. Mohammad bin Salman, having
watched his father’s generation deal with Palestinian leadership led by Abbas and Arafat, is
likely frustrated by the PA’s refusal to adapt to modern circumstances. In March of 2018, the
Crown Prince told an audience of American Jewish organizations that “in the last several
decades the Palestinian leadership has missed one opportunity after the other and rejected all
the peace proposals it was given.” He also said, “it is about time the Palestinians take the
proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table or shut up and stop complaining.”88
The PA will have to make heavy sacrifices on issues such as refugees, settlements, and
Jerusalem. Mohammad bin Salman, wanting normalization with Israel, seeks a Palestinian
partner who can move forward with him and Israel, not one who is stuck in the past and will
only drag the kingdom down in its regional aims. These views are supported by many in the
Saudi academic and political elite. Expressing his impatience with the Palestinians and the
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perceived trouble that they have caused the country, Saudi novelist and writer Turki al-Hamad
tweeted “since 1948 we have been suffering in the name of Palestine. Coups were orchestrated
in the name of Palestine… development was suspended in the name of Palestine… liberties
were repressed in the name of Palestine.”89
There is internal pressure on Palestinian leadership as well. Support for the Palestinian
Authority and President Abbas is low among Palestinians. Satisfaction with the performance of
President Abbas is at 33% and 68% of the Palestinian public would like to see him resign;
specifically, 62% in the West Bank and 81% in Gaza. In all, most Palestinians believe that the PA
has become a burden for the Palestinian people and fear its overarching authority. Over 60% of
Palestinians believe that the PA security services eavesdrop of Palestinian citizens’ phone calls.
Only 33% believe people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear, vs. 63% who say
they can’t criticize it without fear.90
One of Abbas’ last remaining tools to maintain whatever trust and popularity he still holds
with the Palestinian public is the payment of monthly stipends to the families of those who
have committed terror attacks against Israel or have been killed by Israeli forces. Israel views
this practice as incentive to commit terror attacks against Israelis, while the Palestinian
Authority views it as a necessary measure to create an economic safety net for Palestinian
families. The Trump Administration has explicitly asked Abbas to cease these payments, and the
U.S. Congress just recently passed the Taylor Force Act, to stop this payment to the families of
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terrorists and martyrs by the PA. Palestinians have criticized this law as politically motivated
and damaging to peace efforts.91
If the Palestinian Authority wants to continue to be the credible Palestinian governing
body and a part of this new equation in the Middle East, it must work to urgently find a
replacement for Abbas. This will be difficult. The state of Palestinian leadership is in disarray.
Abbas, who was elected to a four-year term in 2005, has succeeded in expelling or isolating all
his political opponents capable of challenging him, and out of fear for becoming a lame duck, he
has not formally appointed or kept anyone close enough to be his possible successor. He has
expelled top contender and his arch-rival Mohamad Dahlan and his associates from Fatah
institutions. A favorite among Palestinians, Marwan Barghouti, is a member of Fatah’s Central
Committee and is currently serving five life-sentences in an Israeli jail for orchestrating a series
of terrorist attacks in 2002- which collectively killed five Israelis. 92 He recently reemerged in
headlines for leading fellow Palestinian prisoners in a hunger strike in jail, until security footage
revealed that he had secretly been eating in his cell. This did not severely impact his popularity
among Palestinians, however.
The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that if Abbas were to run
directly against Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 41% of the votes and Haniyeh
would receive 52%. If elections were held between top Fatah contender Marwan Barghouti and
Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 55% and Haniyeh 39%.93
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The next Palestinian president must be accepted by the Palestinian public, indicating a
certain authenticity, and thus likely to be much more entrenched and noncompromising, like
Abbas. He must also be compatible to the interests of the United States and the Arab Quartet
(Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE.) Top candidates like Marwan Barghouti and Jibril
Rajoub are Fatah insiders and would never cooperate with the Arab states in their regional
ambitions. Those who appear moderate enough to comply with the Arab states, mainly Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, would have to be political outsiders, and would be distrusted by the
Palestinian public. These figures include Naser Al-Qudwa and Mohammad Dahlan. Al-Qudwa,
nephew of Yasser Arafat, is preferred by the Arab states for his moderate stances, but was not
born and raised under the occupation, and thus is perceived as out of touch with the
Palestinian population. An enemy who has been politically isolated by President Abbas,
Mohamad Dahlan is arguably the most qualified and likely candidate, due to his experience in
the Palestinian security apparatus, also putting him in the favor of Israel. However, his
comfortable life and luxurious home in Abdu Dhabi is working against him. He is not suffering in
the occupied territories with his fellow Palestinians, a fact that Abbas would surely seek to
exploit should Dahlan run against him or in succession to him.
In addition, failure to replace Abbas with a candidate within Fatah could result in
inadvertently yielding power to Hamas. The Palestinian Basic Law stipulates that the speaker of
the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) takes over the presidency for 60 days following the
absence, due to death or resignation, of a sitting president. The PLC has not convened since
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2007, and the last speaker, Aziz Dweik, is a Hamas supporter. This means that if implemented
as the law stipulates, the interim Palestinian president could be from the Hamas leadership.94
Abbas’ hardline rhetoric regarding Trump and an American-sponsored peace deal has
been discredited by Arab leaders. Abbas, blatantly refusing to continue cooperating with the
US, has expressed interest in the EU, France, Russia, and China to take a more active role in
facilitating the peace process. Directly contradicting Abbas, Jordan’s King Abdullah has openly
stated that there cannot be a peace process without the presence of the US. Abbas’ hardline
response was a signal to the Palestinian public and to the world that he would not cooperate
with the US and Saudi Arabia. He refused to be the Palestinian leader who compromises on
issues which Palestinians care about the most. In Abbas’ harsh rhetoric which followed
President Trump’s Jerusalem declaration, as well as his refusal to accept the U.S. as a mediator
in peace talks, he has further isolated himself and the PA from much of the world, including the
Arab states. Jordan’s King Abdullah disregarded Abbas’ refusal to work with the U.S. King
Abdullah said at the World Economic Forum in January 2018 that “we cannot have a peace
process or peace solution without the role of the United States.”95 In addition, as of September
2017, 65.5% of Palestinians opposed the dissolution of the Palestinian National Authority and
saw it as necessary to maintain.
To achieve an effective anti-Iranian alliance with Donald Trump and Israel, Mohammad
bin Salman has a key interest in supporting a stable, moderate Palestinian Authority which is
flexible to Trump and Netanyahu’s terms of a peace deal. The transitioning of power to the next
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president after Mahmoud Abbas will be a complicated struggle, due to Abbas’ political isolation
of his potential enemies. The next president must be accepted by the Palestinian public (such as
Marwan Barghouti or Ismail Haniyeh) but also accepted by the Arab states and the
international community (Mohammad Dahlan or Nasser al-Qudwa). It will be challenging to find
a candidate who can meet these criteria, to be accepted by the Palestinian people while
moderate enough to cooperate with regional powers on a peace plan.
Hamas-Fatah Reconciliation
The Palestinian government is still divided between Hamas in Gaza and the Fatah-led
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and it is unlikely that the two will reach a full
reconciliation agreement any time soon. Some of the most contentious issues between Hamas
and Fatah continue to be the management of the crucial Rafah crossing on Gaza’s southern
border with Egypt and the disarmament of Hamas’ military wing, something prioritized by Fatah
and considered a nonstarter for Hamas.96 The assassination attempt of Palestinian Prime
Minister Rami Hamdallah, for which Abbas was quick to blame Hamas, essentially ended the
prospects for reconciliation. Surprisingly, even the Trump Administration’s declaration of
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was not enough to act as a catalyst to unite Hamas and Fatah,
forming a cohesive government with which Israel would be forced to take seriously.
To sum, Gaza has endured three devastating wars with Israel since Hamas’ takeover. In
addition, due to political strife with the PA and Israel’s naval blockade, Gaza only receives a few
hours of electricity per day. Many describe the status of Gaza to be a humanitarian disaster. 97
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Regarding responsibility for the electricity crisis in Gaza, Palestinians in the territories are
differing on who they believe is responsible. 51.6% of residents in Gaza responded that the
Hamas government is responsible, and only 16.9% blamed Israel. Palestinians in the West Bank
were quicker to blame Israel for the electricity crisis in Gaza. 51.1% said Israel was responsible
and only 17.8% blaming Hamas. The people of Hamas recognize the role that Hamas has played
in the electricity crisis, more-so than West Bank residents. This divide is one of many which
keep the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank separated, not only geographically, but in
terms of ideology and beliefs. West Bank residents, who interact with Israelis more often than
Gaza residents, would be quicker to vote for Hamas in an election, because they have not lived
under their regime for 10 years like the residents of Gaza have.
Responsibility for the Crisis in Gaza
Since Hamas initially took power in the Gaza strip in 2007, the 1.8 million residents there
have endured three devastating wars, isolation and restricted movement from the Egyptian and
Israeli blockades, and lack of services from the PA, as a way of putting pressure on Hamas to
cede power in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. This political strife between Hamas and the PA
is the reason Gazan citizens currently receive only a few hours of electricity per day.
For its nearly two million residents, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is deteriorating
rapidly. The lack of drinkable water in Gaza has the U.N. particularly alarmed, and a 2017 report
produced by the Agency found that if measures are not immediately taken to alleviate the
crisis, Gaza will become unlivable by 2020.98 Among Palestinians questioned in the PCPSR
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survey, only 5% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good.99 The lack of clean
water and sanitation facilities also greatly increases the risk of a potential cholera outbreak, as
in Yemen. However, unlike Yemen, Gaza is much more densely populated, and the disease
would not stop at Israel’s border fence. When asked to identify the party or side responsible for
the worsening conditions in Gaza, the largest percentage (39%) blamed Israel; 25% blamed
President Abbas and the PA, and 18% blamed Hamas. Support for Hamas over the PA is
generally stronger among Palestinians who (1) live in refugee camps or cities, compared to
villages and towns, (2) are religious, compared to somewhat or non-religious, (3) among those
with the lowest income, compared to those with higher income, and (4) those who hold a BA
degree, compared to literates.100 From this information, it can be gathered that support for
Hamas is still quite strong, and support for the PA is decreasing substantially. The divide of
Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank is clear, and the reconciliation process is unlikely
to mend those divides, creating a unified Palestinian government soon.
President Trump’s decision to defund UNRWA, the United Nations agency which
oversees the welfare of Palestinian refugees, had many implications, and greatly exacerbated
the ensuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The decision to cut over $60 million from U.S. aid to
UNRWA was opposed by the Israeli defense establishment, the Shin Bet, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (which is led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who serves as his own foreign minister.)
Israel considers the stability of Gaza of high importance due to the risk of war breaking out
from the severe desperation of the people in Gaza. Past trends indicate that aggressive
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behavior on the part of Hamas may be due to an attempt to gain support among an increasingly
frustrated public. Approval ratings for Hamas and its leadership rose significantly after
Operation Protective Edge in 2014.101 The Palestinian people also believe that this move was a
deliberate target against their right of return. When asked why they believed the Trump
Administration did this, 43.2% believed that it was meant to be political pressure to force Abbas
to return to the negotiating table. A majority, 51.5%, believed it was a move to close the
refugee file and completely remove it from negotiations.102
In the time since the 1993 Oslo Accords instituted the two-state solution as the primary
structure for a future peace agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, changing realities on
the ground of hindered its feasibility, and many on both sides of the conflict believe it to be
unviable. Settlement expansion in strategic locations in the West Bank has threatened the
possibility of a future contiguous Palestinian state. Hamas’ election victory in 2006 and the
following Lebanon war that summer discredited the idea of “land for peace” in the eyes of
Israelis, reinforced by the continued threat of terror from both borders. The two-state solution,
as conceptualized in the Oslo Accords, is no longer perceived as a possibility by Israelis and
Palestinians. When added to the recent Iranian expansion in the Middle East and other regional
developments pushing Israel and the Sunni Arab states closer in relations, it appears the
Palestinian question and the pursuit of a just two-state solution is no longer a top priority of the
Arab states. This differs from decades of the traditional Arab-approach, calling for Israel to
withdraw from all territories seized in 1967, allow for the creation of a Palestinian state with
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East Jerusalem as its capital, and a right of return. Arab states have always supported these
Palestinian ambitions, but because of the mutual threats and interests posed by an increasingly
aggressive Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East, Arab leaders are now more willing to push
for the adoption of a peace deal which is less favorable to the Palestinians.
Components of the American-Saudi Proposal
Given the status of the two-state solution and the implications brought by the shifting
priorities and alliances by regional powers, the deal likely to be proposed by the American
Administration, in conjunction with the Arab states as part of a regional-peace deal, will be
heavily favored to Israel. This alternative to the two-state solution will exclude some of the
critical components of the traditional solution that have been demanded by the Palestinians
throughout the history of the peace process. Any future Palestinian state, entity, or enclave, is
likely to be will exclude full sovereignty, East Jerusalem as a capital, and a large-scale right of
return for Palestinian refugees. These components have historically been crucial to the twostate solution, and to the implementation of a wider, regional peace deal. During this round of
negotiations unlike those of the past, the Arab states have signaled that they will not back up
the Palestinians.
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Land Swaps and Settlements
In addition to social and economic improvement for Palestinians in Gaza, a second
pressure point would involve a critical rethinking about land swaps. Land swaps are a crucial
component to the successful implementation of any peace deal. The concept of mutual land
swaps, for Israel to maintain over large settlement blocs in exchange for Israeli land annexed to
a Palestinian state, were evident in the Camp David Summit in 2000 and Olmert’s proposal in
2008. Some of the key principles to territorial exchanges in any sort of deal are (1) A land swap
ratio of 1:1. (2) Israeli annexation of areas that are home to approximately 70-80% of settlers.
(3) Israeli annexation of a minimal amount of land acquired in 1967. (4) No Palestinian
dislocation. (5) Measures that satisfy Israeli security concerns. (6) A contiguous Palestinian state
in the West Bank.103
The land swaps that would have to be made at this point would be much larger than
those proposed as part of the Geneva talks, potentially causing more domestic turmoil in Israel
than it saw in 2005, when just 8,000 settlers were forcibly evicted from their homes in Gaza as
part of the disengagement plan. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, a think tank
with focus on international security and U.S. Middle East Policy, has compiled different
scenarios of territorial exchanges, all of which offer the potential for a contiguous Palestinian
state, excluding the issues of Kiryat Arba and Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley.
In the first scenario, Israel would annex land holding 43 of the main settlements,
confined within five major blocs. This territory holds 80.1% of settlers, 239,246 in total. The
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remaining 19.99% (59,782) live in 77 communities, known as “non-bloc” settlements, and these
would be evacuated and become a part of a Palestinian state. In total, Israel would annex
4.73% of the West Bank, including some of the most contentious settlements: Ariel, the zone
north of Ariel, Kfar Adumim, and the expanded area of Ofra and Beit El. This total land area is
293.1 square kilometers.
In a second scenario, Israel would annex all settlements mentioned in scenario one
except Ofra, Beit El, and other small settlements in that area (expanded Ofra and Beit El.) This
brings the number of settlers annexed into Israel down to 219,223, or 73.31% of total settlers,
in 38 settlements instead of 43. This would leave 79,805 settlers in 82 settlements outside of
Israel, and decrease the land annexed to 4.31% of the West Bank. Excluding Beit El and Ofra
from a land swap deal would be difficult for any Israeli government. Beit El has biblical
significance and Ofra is home to many leaders of the settler movement. This would lead to
tremendous upheaval by Israel’s religious groups and parties, including many in the Israeli
government. For this reason, this option is highly unfeasible.
In a third scenario, Israel would not annex expanded Ofra and Beit El, the zone north of
Ariel, or Kfar Adumim, which collectively hold 34,444 people. This calls for annexing 32
settlements and leaving 88 outside of jurisdiction. The number of settlers absorbed into Israel
would be 219,223, or 68.49%, on 3.72% of the land. The number of settlers left outside of Israel
would jump to 94,226. The increased number of Israelis that would need to be forcibly or
voluntarily evacuated and resettled makes this option even more undesirable for the Israeli
government. Of these three scenarios produced by the Washington Institute, negotiators would
likely use models such as these to establish where the line is drawn on settlement and land
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annexation. Israel would prefer scenario one, the Palestinians would prefer scenario three.
These produced scenarios are a good starting point for negotiations, in which the United States
and Arab states can play a role in intervening to seek an agreement.
Some settlements which are not mentioned in these land swap scenarios are the
particularly thorny ones for negotiations, Kiryat Arba and the Jewish part of Hebron (H2). Due
to the religious significance of Hebron, and the nationalistic and religious settlers which live in
Kiryat Arba, any land swap proposal would likely include Israeli desire to annex a route through
the southeast West Bank from Israel to Kiryat Arba, careful to avoid annexing any Palestinian
villages.104 An American-proposed peace deal would likely include at least permanent Jewish
access to the settlements, if not annexation of them. Anything less would not be accepted by
the religious parties in the current government coalition. However, Israeli annexation of the
settlements has never been accepted by any Palestinian negotiating team, though some
agreement could be reached, with help from the U.S. and Arab states, to ensure Jewish access
to the holy sites in Hebron.
To annex as much of the West Bank as it can, Israel is prepared to cede land inside Israel
proper to a Palestinian state, focusing north and southwest of the West Bank, where there is
arable land for farming or industry. Due to Gaza’s current state and its denser population than
the West Bank, more land which would be ceded to a future Palestinian state by Israel would
be adjacent to Gaza rather than the latter. The land immediately to the Southeast of Gaza,
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north Chalutzah, southeast of Gaza, is easily irrigatable and could be used as a major industrial
center or for agriculture. More Gazans today work in industry than agriculture.105
An idea which has long been considered by Israeli officials is creating a Palestinian state
in part of the Sinai Peninsula, directly bordering Gaza. This idea has always been met with
rejection from the Palestinians and Egyptians (As of April of 2018 86% of Palestinians are
opposed to this idea, though the idea is understandably more popular in Gaza than in the West
Bank).106 However, with the current leadership in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt,
the idea could become more relevant and brought back on the table in this latest round of
discussion. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the north of Sinai would present Egypt
with an opportunity to greatly expand security cooperation with Israel and would lift a severe
economic and military burden from the Egyptian government.
Once again, shifting pressures from players beyond Israel and the Palestinians may
contribute to a revitalization of this long-rejected idea. In this case, pressure point is President
Al-Sisi’s draining war against the Islamic State affiliated group in the Sinai Peninsula State of
Sinai, or Walayat Sinai. In the Egyptian army’s ongoing campaign against the Islamic State
affiliates, it has destroyed entire neighborhoods near the Gaza border in Rafah, seeking to
create a buffer zone with Gaza. Continued evacuations of Egyptian citizens from areas such as
Rafah, Sheikh Zuweid, and Al-Arish are part of a major counter-terrorism plan.107 However, it
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may also be for potentially resettling Palestinians in this land. Again, 86% of Palestinians oppose
this idea.108

A 720 square kilometer plot of land, from Rafah, to Sheikh Zuweid, to Al-Arish, if added
to the Gaza strip, would triple its size. Adding this land to a Palestinian state could be the
rationale for allowing Israel to annex some of the West Bank settlements outside of the security
barrier, like Ariel, Ofra, Beit El, or even Hebron and Kiryat Arba. An additional component to this
plan could be Israel ceding some land in the Negev to Egypt, in Nahal Paran, allowing for a
direct access route from Egypt to Jordan.109 The Israeli government, if it were forced to make
serious concessions, would surely prefer to relinquish territory around Gaza and even in the
Negev in exchange for as much of the West Bank as possible.
If Al-Sisi did cede territory in the northern Sinai to a Palestinian state, it would likely be
met with public uproar. The Egyptian people already stood by and watched as Al-Sisi gave away
the strategic Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia. Located in and near the Strait of Tiran,
essentially controlling access from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba, these islands are of high
importance to Israeli and Jordanian shipping. This transfer of power was another sign of
growing Egyptian-Israeli and Saudi-Israeli trust and partnership. Netanyahu was so confident
that this agreement would continue to preserve Israel’s maritime security that he approved
plans for the King Salman Bridge, linking the Sinai to the Saudi mainland.110 The Egyptian
response to the island transfer was significant as well. The lack of serious demonstrations and
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dissent proved to the Egyptian authorities that ceding land from the Sinai for a Palestinian state
may not result in the blowback that was once expected.
Gaza-Focused Palestine
Whether it be a state with full or limited sovereignty, the peace plan proposed by the
Trump administration is likely to focus heavily on rebuilding Gaza and shifting power and
influence there away from the West Bank. Weakening the PA government’s influence in the
West Bank and focusing more energy and resources on quickly solving Gaza’s civilian and
infrastructure crises would more easily allow Israel to annex territory and assert control over
much of the West Bank upon the creation of a Palestinian state. This would be done with
Egyptian cooperation in easing the blockade and restrictions in Gaza, and ultimately helping to
create a more thriving Palestinian society and state in Gaza than in the West Bank. However, it
is also vital that Gaza no longer be under the control of Hamas. Israel, keeping with its policy of
not recognizing Hamas as part of a legitimate Palestinian government, will not cede any
territory to Gaza or grant the coastal enclave any real autonomy if Hamas remains in power.
Given the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, Israeli officials have proposed ideas and
projects to uplift Gaza from its current state, for the benefit of the people in Gaza and the
security of Israel. Due to the severity of the humanitarian crisis, the Israeli Army has suggested
a $1 billion plan to rehabilitate Gaza, including a $710 million desalinization plant ($250 million
from donor countries), a $36 million new electricity line to Gaza, to double the amount of
electricity going to Gaza from Israel, and investments of $800 million to connect Gaza to natural
gas, and $31.5 million for solar energy in Gaza. Israeli minister of intelligence and
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transportation Israel Katz has suggested the construction of an artificial island 5 kilometers into
the sea, linked to Gaza by bridge. The island proposed would cost an estimated $5 billion and
would be eight square kilometers. It would likely have a marine port, a hotel, a small port for
yachts, and eventually, possibly an airport. It would have electricity and desalinization plants.
The main contributors to the project would be Saudi and Chinese companies. In theory, this
island would give the Palestinians an outlet to the world without endangering Israeli security.111
This ambitious project would not likely be implemented at the scale which is proposed, rather
certain projects would be chosen based on their sense of urgency. Electricity and desalinization
plants are more crucial now than an airport, which the Palestinians are highly unlikely to get in
any sort of plan. The alternative to this plan would be that Israel continues to pay for Gaza’s
increasing costs of water, electricity, food, and other goods supplied to Gaza. The construction
of this island would help build the Gazan economy, increasing the quality of life in Gaza,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of support and recruitment for terrorist groups. An Americanproposed peace deal will focus heavily on rehabilitating Gaza, to shift the Palestinian
government, economy, and resources there, thereby allowing expanded Israeli control in the
West Bank (e.g. annexation of the most contentious settlements, like Ariel, Kfar Adumim, Ofra,
Beit El, and Kiryat Arba.)
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The Right of Return

A large-scale return or Palestinian refugees and their descendants to what is now and
will be in any given peace deal, the Israeli state, would undoubtedly threaten Israel’s existence
as a Jewish state. An influx of millions of refugees into Israel would throw the country into
political chaos. However, as there have been offers in the past of Israel accepting certain
numbers of refugees, rather symbolic and for family reunification purposes, as opposed to a
real implementation of the Palestinian desired “right of return” for what is now five million
people. The proposals of past negotiations have ranged from 5,000 upwards to 100,000. The
government of Israel informed the United States that it would accept 100,000 Arab refugees for
family reunification in 1949, shortly after the state’s founding.112

Seeing as a right of return for all refugees is a non-starter for Israel, Mohammad bin
Salman is has expressed to the Palestinian president that this would not be included in an offer
presented by the Trump Administration.113 Today, Israeli officials understand that there must
be some right of return, and Israel must accept some, albeit a small number of refugees. This
idea, which is so fundamental to the Palestinian narrative, is truly the cornerstone of the future
of the Palestinian people in all historic Palestine and the diaspora, and it is not a demand that
will be given up lightly by any Palestinian leader. 30% of Palestinians believe that the first most
vital goal, even superseding ending the occupation and building a functioning Palestinian state,
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should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages.114 Former
Israeli President Shimon Peres once said “you don’t ask a people to give up their dream. You
just don’t let them turn it into our nightmare.”115 Palestinian leadership must understand that a
full-scale right of return is out of the question, but Israeli leadership must also understand that
no right of return is not an option either.

The Capital of Palestine

East Jerusalem being the capital of the future state of Palestine is one of the most
pressing demands among the Palestinians and the PA. President Abbas confirmed in a speech
to the Palestinian Legislative Council in Ramallah that the deal that was being offered to him
included Abu Dis as Palestine’s capital.116 The idea of Abu Dis as the Palestinian capital is not a
new concept. It had been discussed extensively in the past, and the Palestinian Authority began
construction on the Palestinian parliamentary building in the suburb just east of Jerusalem. It is
only 1.5 kilometers from the Old City. If it were to become the future capital of Palestine,
infrastructure would be put in place to ensure easy access for Muslims to pray freely at the AlAqsa Mosque and the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in the Old City. The capital of Abu Dis
would be conjoined with the adjacent town Al-Azaria.117 While this idea may be popular for the
American administration, the Arab states, and Israel, it is a non-starter for the Palestinians and
the PA. An overwhelming 94% of Palestinians oppose it and 4% support the idea.118 The more
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feasible option for the location of Palestine’s capital is Ramallah, in the central West Bank just
north of Jerusalem. Ramallah is already the de facto capital of the Palestinian Authority, its
leadership, and its government ministries and other institutions.
Demilitarization and Security in the Jordan Valley
Regardless of level of autonomy the Palestinians attain in any future agreement,
whether it be statehood, semi-sovereignty, or a confederation status with Jordan or Egypt, any
Palestinian entity would have to be demilitarized to be accepted by Israel. What will likely be
proposed by the American-proposed deal is a demilitarized state with a strong police force and
other internal security forces, which will continue to conduct security operations in conjunction
with Israeli forces. The Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv has a potential
withdrawal plan from the West Bank which is compatible with Israeli security needs. Before
Israel ever withdraws from the West Bank as they did from Gaza, they need to have more
“insurance policies” in mind other than the last resort option of reinvading and reoccupying, or
fencing off completely, such was the case with Gaza. Part of any long-term peace deal would
have to ensure multiple “insurance policies” so that the possibility of having to reoccupy the
West Bank is decreased. These other insurance policies must be (1) Stronger economic relations
with Arab countries. (2) Increased border security, including the completion of the separation
barrier. (3) Joint counter-terrorism activities with Palestinian forces in Palestine (establishment
of a Security Implementation and Verification Group). (4) Gradual, condition-based
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redeployment. (5) External monitors of the process of disengagement such as the United
States, Jordan, and Egypt. And (6) The undesired option of reoccupying the West Bank. 119
The American Administration’s proposed deal will also likely include Israel holding at
least a temporary presence in the Jordan Valley, as it has always insisted on the grounds of
security. Israeli negotiations have always requested early warning stations, mobile patrols,
airspace rights, and supply bases in the Jordan Valley, as well as the right to redeploy forces to
the Jordan River in the event of an external threat that constituted a “national state
emergency” in Israel.120
Conclusion
Over the course of Israel’s 50 years of occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip, the
viability of the traditional two-state solution has decreased. It appears that a two-state solution
based on the pre-1967 war boundaries is no longer an option. Other key aspects of this most
ideal peace deal are becoming less feasible, such as a large-scale right of return for refugees
and now possibly East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. However, the most significant
factor influencing the future of the peace process today is the current shifting of relationships
and dynamics between important regional powers in the Middle East. The signing of the JCPOA
in 2015 and the various strategic victories throughout the Middle East which have followed,
have emboldened Iran to accelerate an increasingly-aggressive foreign policy. Iran’s increased
presence in the Middle East has threatened the security of both Israel and the Saudi-led Gulf
states, who have begun to develop a strong, strategic partnership more than ever before.
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Because of the desire of the Arab states to expand this cooperation, Israel is no longer forced to
accept the traditional two-state solution. Israel is gaining much more leverage and from the
support from regional players and the Trump Administration, and the Palestinians are losing
leverage in negotiations as Arab countries are finding it to be in their interest to align with
Israel.
If President Trump proposes an American-sponsored peace deal, likely with cooperation
from Saudi Arabia, it is highly likely that the proposal will heavily favor Israel. Due to the proIsrael bias in the administration, and Arab tacit approval for actions like the Jerusalem decision,
the deal will likely not result in a two-state solution with the guarantee of Palestinian
sovereignty, a capital in Jerusalem, or a right return. It will be a semi-autonomous entity, with
continued Israeli military presence in the newly created state of Palestine (albeit likely
temporary.) The Palestinians will be lucky to be allowed an international airport in Gaza. What
should be expected from this deal is an autonomous Palestinian entity in Gaza and the West
Bank (less of the West Bank than has been proposed in the past). It will be a fractured state
with limited sovereignty, rather than a sovereign and contiguous one. Because of the players
and changing landscape of the Middle East, this is the reality the Palestinians now face after 70
years of conflict and 50 years of Israeli occupation. This is the reality of an Israeli foothold in the
American administration and in the favor of the most powerful Arab states. The traditional twostate solution, and many of the Palestinians’ most crucial demands, are no longer on the table.
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